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OHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Memory haa alwaya been a favorlte topl0 of reaearch, for it
1. one of the moat preclous glfts nature haa given us.
present the.l. this toplc 18 taken up again.

In the

Aa the title of the

thesi. indlcates, it 1s a presentation of St. Thomaa t doctrine on
sen•• memory.
this:

The que.tion to be anawered by the,th•• ia is slmply

What d08. St. fboma. aay .ense memory is?
There are two types ot memory in the teachlng. of St.

Thom&s--intellectual and sen.e memory_

That there i. a memoratlTe

power on the intellectual level is proved by St. Thoma. from a
hi.torical fact which he take. from the Scrlptures.

Dlscussing

St. Paul's mystic experience of seeing God in rapture and ot
afterwards remembering the vision, Aquinas conclude. that there i.
a pure intellectual me.ory in man. l

However, in the psychology at

lRla argument i. a8 tollows: "Ad tertium dioendum quod
Paulu., poatquam ceasavit videre Deum per e •• entla., .emor tult
illorum quae in 111a visione cognoverat, per allquas .pecie. intelliglbile. habltualiter ex hoc in .lus intellectu rellctas, sicut
etiam, abeunt. senaibili, remanent aliquae impreasione. in anima:
qua. poatea convertens ad phantaamata,· memorabatur. Unde nee totao
illam cognltionem aut cogitarepoterat, aut verbls exprimere." S.~~
II-II, 175, 4 ad 3. !he Bub.equent reterencea to the Summa will ie
made to the edition with the Leonine text, ·edited wiUb note. and aD
introduction by Petrus Oaramello. Taur1nl-Romae, 19$0.
1

2

St. !noma. intellectual memory receive. only a secondary consideration.

Tne verf notion of memor,r includes some consciousness

ot ttMe, or more precisely, of past time.

Since pastness is

associated with materIal conditiona, such as magnitude and dlstanc., tne knowledge ot the past properly belongs to the sensitive
part ot the aoul,2 and consequently m.mory proper is sense memory,
not intellectual.

-

In the De ...............................
Veri tate st. Thomas says: "Unde, cum

memoria secundum propriam sui acceptionem respiciat ad id quod est
praeter1tum respectu hujus nunc: constat quod memoria, propria
loquendo, non est in parte intellectiva, sed senaitiva tantum, ut
Philosophus probat.")

St. ~omast chief concern in dealing with

memory, therefore, 1s not that memorative power which belongs to
the intellectual part ot the soul, but that which belongs to senae.
Accordingly, the main burden of this work is going to be the explanation ot St. Thomas' concept of sense memory.

The intellectual

.emory will be mentioned only in so far as it will help to understand better sense memory.
Aa tar as it could be asoertained, no one haa undertaken a
s1milar study on memory in St. Thomas.

A number of authors have

treated other internal senaes quIte extensively, but none of them

2n[MJe.oria secundum commune. usus loquentium accipitur pro
notitia praeteritorum. Cognoscere autem praeteritum utpraeteritum, eat ejus eujus eat cognoscex-e praeaens ut praeaens, vel nunc
ut nunc; hoc autem est sensus." De Ver~, 10, 2 c, S. Thomaa
~,U1natiS Quaestiones Diaputatae,-ed:-W. Spiazzi at-al., 2 vola.
( auriril-Romae, 1949), I, p. 194.

)1!!!!. '!'he place in Aristotle is l2.!..!!!!. • .!! 1!!!!., 1, 4.50 a, 14

)

has written &Q1thing, a book or even an article, devoted exclusively to the study or senae

memo~.

Some discusslon on tnis

-

rorgotten senae can be found in works such as The Disoursive
Power, . by the Rev. George p. Klubertanz, S. J ., or The
"Sensus Communis"

!2!!. .2! :.E!l!.

!!! the PSlcholoQ B.!.§!. 'l'homas Aquinas by the

Rey. Edmund J. Ryan, C.PP.S.

But there, too, sense memory is

mentioned only in passing and in so rar as it helps to explain
the matter at hand, i.e., the
communis.

!!!

~ogitativa

or the sensus

Brief expositions of St. Thomas' oonoept or sense

memory can be tound in textbooks and works in general psychology.
Tnese, as well as various commentaries on St. Thomas, suoh as
Cajetan and John or st. Thomas, will be consulted and used in this
study to point up or emphasize the implic1t thought in St. Thomas'
own works.

The chiet sources, however, 11'111 be the works ot St.

Thomas himself.
The method or procedure of the thesis will be exegetical.
The texts ot

st. Thomas will be atudied directly_ Tne explicit

statements will be analy.ed and then turther developed in the
light of other texts.

The incidental rererenoes to sense memory

will be used to throw further light on the truth contained in the
direct statements on memory.

The development of the thesis will

follow the logical rather than the chronological order.

There

will be a need of making an occasional use ot the secondary
sourc •• , but this w1l1 be done only to clarity and point up the
primary sources.

CHAPTER II
MDORY AS AN INTERNAL SENSE
Before saying what sense memory for St. Thomas is, it will be
helpful to knQ" what it is not.

The pt-oblemof specification of

memory is the problem of distinguishing it

~om

other internal

senses, with whieb, as will be seen, it 1s closely connected.

To

understand the nature of memory, it 1s neoessary to study it first
in its relationship to the other powers of internal sensation.
For this purpose a somewhat detailed discussion of St.
Thomas' own summary on the theory of the tour internal senses 11'111
be helpful.

In

~.l.,

I, 78,

40

he outlines the main points of

his teaehings on the common sense, imagination, the estimative
sense, and memory_

St. Thomas begins the article by stating the

prinoiple of distinguishing the powers:

H[C]um natura non de-

ficiat in neoessariis, oportet esse tot actiones animae sensitivae
quat sutflclant ad vitam an1malis perfeot!.

Et quaeoumque harum

actionum non possunt reduci In unum principlum, requlrunt dlvarsas potentias: cum potentia animae nihil allud sit quam proxlmum principium operationi. antmae."l

This is a brief recapitula-

l~.!., I, 78, 4 c (init.); ct. also g.~. ~ ~., 13 c, ad. M.
Caloaterra and T. S. Canti, in S~ Thama. Aquinatls -Quaestiones
Disputatae, ed. R. Splazzi et ar., ~ Vola. (Taurfni-Romae, 1949),

II, 329-30.

5
tion of what he has to say on the same point in the thlpd article
of the preoeding question of.' the Su.mm.a..

There he states:

{P]otentia, seoundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad
acturn. Undo oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex aotu ad
quem ordinatur: et per consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae dlversi£icatur, ut dlversiflcatur ratio actus. Ratio
autem actus diverslfioatur secundum diversam 1"ationem obiecti. Omnis enlm actio vel est potentiae activae, vel
passivae. Obleetum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae
passivae, siout principlum et causa r.a.ovens: color onim Inquantum movet visum, est prinolpium vlsionis. Ad actum
autem potentiae activae comparatur obieot~~ ut terminus at
finis: siout augmentatlvae virtutis obieotum est quantum
perfectum, quod est finis augmenti. Ex his autcm duobus
actio speoiem recipIt, scilicet ex principio, vel ex fine
seu termino: dlftert enlm calefactio ab Infrigidatlons,
••oundum quod haec quidem a calido, scilicet act1vo, ad
ca11dumi ill a autem a frlg1do ad frigidum procedit. Unde
neoesse est quod potentiae divera1t1centur secundum aotus
at ob1ecta. 2
Potencies, then, are determined proximately by their acts, ultimately by their objects.

Potency~

as such, is ordered to act.

Therefore, the nature of the potency is discovered from the nature
of the act.

The act, in its turn, is determined by the object

with which it 15 concerned.
Tho objeot is not anr objeot existing outside the knowing
faculty, but an object in so far as it affects the cognoscitive
power:

"Sic igitur non quaecumque diversitas

obiectorlli~

diversl-

tleat potentias anilllas; sed differentia eius ad quod per ae potentia 1"esp1oit."3

It is that part 01" that aspeot ot an objeot which

2S.T., I, 77, 3 c.

3Ibid.

Cf. also In II De An., 6, nn. )04-307 (eap. 307),
1948), pp. 78-79.

8d. Ange 0 M. Pirotta.-'ra-e~ T!aurin1-Romae,

6
formally affects the faculty.

Henoe, the name--the formal object.

The distinction of' formal objects requires the distinct.ion of
faculties, and therefore the distinction of internal senses ultimately must be based on the distinction of their formal objeots.
What are the formal objects of eaoh of the internal senses?

st. Thomas discusses this point in the subsequent paragraphs
ot the same artiole.

Fi~st

he distlnguishes common sense and

Imagination:
Est autem oonsiderandum quod ad vitam an1ma118 perfeoti
requirltur quod non solum apprehendat rem apud praesentlam
senslbl11s, sed etlam. apud 8ius absentiam. Alloquln, cum
animalls motus et actio sequantur apprehensionom, non moveretur animal ad inquirendum aliquid absens; Guius contrarium
apparet maxime in animalibus perfectis, quae liIDventur motu
processivo, moventur en1m. ad aliquid absena apprehensum.
Oportet ergo quod animal pOI' uni~'1l sensi tivam non solu,,'u
recipiat species .ensIbl1Ium, cum praesentialiter immutatur
ab eis; sed st1am eas retlneat at oonservet. Recipc~e autem
et retinere reducuntur incorpo~alibus ad diversa principia:
nam hwnida bene reoipill.t."1t, ot male retinent; e contral'10
autem est de siccia. Uode, oum potentia sensitiva sit actus
organ1 corpora11s, oportct esse aliau1 potentiam quae reoiplat species sensibI11um, etquae oonservet.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
SIc ergo ad receptlonem tormarum sens1b111um ordinatur
sensus Ero2rluD at communis: de quorum distinctione post
a!ce£ur. -Xd harum autem formarum retantionem aut conservatlonem ordlnatur ¥hantasia, sive i1nasinatio, quae idem
aunt: est enim phantas a sIve lmaglnatlo quasI thesaurus
quldam formarum per sensum acoeptarum.4
We find tha.t higher animals are capable of receivlng sense impressions such as hard, sweet, white.

This is the task of the

external senses which receive the impressions according to their

4~.!., I, 78,

4 o.

7
own formal objects, and of the common sense whioh distinguishes
between the different senslb1es and knows the operations of' the
external senses.

From observation it is evident that animals

know objects not only when they are present to the senses, but
also when they are absent, for they go out in searoh of such objects.

The sensitive soul of the animal must, therefore, be able

not only to receive the sensible species, but also to retain them
once they have been reoeived.

The power of reoept10n is distinct

from the power of retention, for the senses belong to the realm
of material things where to receive and to retain are based on
different px-inoiples.

For instanoe, what is damp reoeives well,

but retains poorly; what is dry, on the contrary, reoeives poorly,
but retains well.

Therefore, as regards the reoeption and re-

tention of sensible forms, we must assume two different powers in
the sensitive soul ot an animal.

The power ot reoeption is the

sensus communis (and the external senses). and the power of re-

_

r

tention 1s imagination or phantasy.
Having diacu••ad the distinotion of the oommon sense and
imagination, St_ Thomas moves on to oonsider the other two oorrelative senses--the estimative sense and memory_

Of these he

sa,.s:
(8]i an1m.al moveretur solum propter delectabile et oontristabile seoundum sensum, non asset neoessarium pon~re in animali
nlsi apprehensionem formarum qual perolpit sensus, in qui bus
delaotatur aut harrat. Sed neoessarium est animali ut
quaerat aliqua vel fuglat, non solum quae aunt oonvenientla
vel non oonveniantia ad santlendum, sed et1am p~opter a11qua. alias oommoditates at utilltates, sive nooumenta:
siout ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter In-

8
decentiam coloris vel figUrae, sed quasi inimicum naturae;
at similiter avis colllgit i)paleam, non quia delectet sensum,
sed quIa est utilis ad nid_tlc$ndum. Necessarium est ergo
animali quod peroipiat hUil:0dl intentiones quas non percipit sensus exterior. Et , ius peroeptionis oportet esse
aliquod aliud prinolplum: 0 . peroeptio tormarum senslbll!um
sit ex immutatione s.nslbI1~sJ non autem peroeptio intentionum praediotarum.
\
1

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

\

\.

•

i.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non
acoipiuntur, ordlnatur vis "1tIlilE+tiva. -Ad oonservandum
autem eas, vis memoratlva, que es\tthesaurus quidam huiusmodI Intentionum. C:u!us sIgnUm. es~, quod principIwu memol'and! tit in anlmallbus ex allqua hu~usmodi intentione, puta
quod est noeivum vel eonvenlen~. E'Ii, ipsa ratio praeterIti,
quam att~ndit memoria, inter ~~usmo~l intentiones co~
putatur.;;I
:i 'I,
\
J

\

From experience we know that animals reaot tQ oertain situations
:1'

'"

,

,

1n suoh a way as to indioate that FlU"Y' ~ave mo~e than just sensory
I ' !

\,

There is instinotive lrJ.howled~ in ~\an1mal by which

cognition.

i~'~

it knows that an objeot is good or harmful fol'

This kind ot

knowledge is not perceived by the iexternal \senses.

A sheep flees

a wolt regardless it it is brown o~ blaok. ~'lhe animals must be
l

\\

oonsoious ot something over and ablq,ve what th~,Y perceive by theil'
1

external senses,

\

\

'lh1s "something": \is oal1er b1' st. Thomas inten-

tiones or intentiones insensatae.
P

I

f

Since these "intentions" are

nc)it
,"

oaused

dire~~ly
.

properly sensible and henoe no phantasm
!

oOl'responcl~ng
\

produoed either in the external se.ses or in the
:,\

the imagination, their presenoe

i~/.n
,

\\

by what is

.

to them is

o~on
I

I

'

I

sense or

animal requir\e$ a distinct
I

power by which the sensitive being perceives them. "Tliis power is
\
!"

I

-

5Ibid.

ii

I,

1\

1\
~

\

\

9
oalled the estimative sense.
But the intentions must be retained after they have been
reoeived.

Receiving and retaining belong to different prinoiples}

therefore there must be another interior sense whose function
would be to retain the intentions of the estimative sense.

Th1s

interior senae is called memory.
Memory 1s a complementary sense to the !!! aestimatlva, just
as imagination is complementary to common sense.

st. Thomas

oalls the imagination the treasury of forms, and memory the
treasury of intentions.
The common sense and imagination are conoerned with the
forms of sensible things.

The common sense receives them, the

imagination retains them.

The notion ot receiving, as opposed to

J.1'etalning, implies that the objeot is present to the sense when
it 1s received.

The oommon sense, then, operates only when the

forms are presented to it by the external senses.

Its concern

is with the sensible forms as present. 6
The object oeales to be "received" and begins to be
"retatned" as aoon aa it beoomes absent to the external senses.
The imagination retains the original impressions when the objeot
is no longer present to the perceIvIng consoiousness.

The formal

object 01 the imaginatIon, therefore, is the sensible forms as

-

6 Ib1d • (paulo post !nit.).

10

absent. 7
The same distinction of formal objeots holds also for the
estimative sense and memory.

The formal objeot of the former is

the intentions as present, and of the latter the intentions as
absent.

The insensate forma are evoked in animal oonsoiousness

when useful or harmful things are aotually stimulating the aenses,
that ls, when they are present.

The funotion of sense memory, on

the other hand, is to retain these insensate torma, when the objeot 1s absent.

"[Clum de ratione memorias sit conserval's species

rerum quae actu non apprehenduntur.n8
The distinction of faoulties aooording to the dlfferenoe of
the presenoe or ahsenoe of the objeot requires a little further
explanation.

Is the presenoe or absence of an object a real

formality. sufflcient to justify the real distinotion of the
powers of the soul. or 1s it not?
answer.

To this St. Thomas has a ready

In the tollowing statement St. Thomas speaks of the ob-

jeot of memory whioh is the past, not merely absent.
question is:
powers?

Henoe, the

Do the past and the present differentiate the

In the Summa St. Thomas says:
I

I

"[P)raeteritum et prae-

sens possunt esse proprle differentiae potent1arum sensitivarum
7Ibid. ct. also Robert Brennan, O.P., "The Thomistio Concept
of ImagInation;" The New Soholasticism, XV (1941), 157, where he
says: "It, then,~e-rorma! objeot or common sense is the sensible ~ua present, the formal object of imaginal power is the
senaih e ~ua absent." .

--

8s •T., I, 79. 6 o.

11

div.rsiticativae; non autem potentiarum intelleotivarum. ff9

The

characterisation ot objects as "past" and "present" is valid tor
the distinction ot the faculties of sense, but not valid for the
distinction of the taculties ot the intellect.
why?

It may be asked,

John ot St. Thomas commenting on the passage says:
• • • [Rlation.m 2raeteriti et 2raesentis ex parte obi.oti
posse dlstinguere potentIas apprehenslvas materiales, non
vero potentiam Intelleotivam, eo quod ista ex suo genere
et proprla ratione obieQtiva abstrahit a oonditionibus
materialibus at resp101t res 1n universali. Unde modus
praeteritl vel praesentIs, qui sunt modi singularitatls,
non po.aunt varlare potentiam Intellectivam, bene tamen
potentiam sensitlvam, quae versatur ciroa singularia seoundum Immutatlonem, qua ab obiecto Imm.utatur potentia et
trahuntur res ad Ipsam. Unde quod Ista mutatio pendeat a
praesentla senaibil1 et singularl ipslus obiecti vel ab
11la abstrahat et independenter ab illa moveat, dlversum
modum abf8ract1orem ponit in ipsa immutatlone et motione
obiect.1.

The intellect abstracts from the material conditIons ot singulars.
It knows the essences of things which are always the same, universal.

Absenoe or presenoe of an objeot does not affect the

understanding in knowing its essence, tor it is not limited by
the here-and-now oonditions by whioh the sensibility is limited.
Sense knowledge is of singulars and 1s dependent on their action.
Hence, they must be present to the sense, in order to be known by

B!

!1 Sensa to, St. Thomas

them.

In his commentary on the

aaya:

"[Slenaus antem est singularium quae sunt hie at nunc.
,

.

~ensu

Et

,

lOJoannea a Sancto Thoma,

9Ibid., I, 79, 7 ad 2.

O~P., Cursus PhilOSO~h10US Thom!sticna, Phil. Nat. P. IV, Q. VIII. art:-lIYT e~. P.eatus ReIser,
o.s.B. (Taurlni, 1937), New ad., III, 260.-

12
ideo secundum suam prop~iam ~ationem non est cognosoitivus nisi
praesentium. hll Properly speaking, aense knows the present. But
it it knows something absent or past, it must be moved by a principle whioh is independent ot the presence ot the object, and as
such dIverse trom that which is dependent.

Presenoe and abaence

ot the objeot requIres, then, a diverse moving principle, and
therefore the differentiation of sense powers according to the
presence or absence ot the objeot must be valId.
tinction between the two moving

p~inciples

As the dis-

is real, the dIs-

tinction ot the faoulties must be real, too.
And so,

st. Thomas conoludes the article of

the Summa on the

distinotion ot the internal senses, stating: "Et a10 non est
necesse ponere nisi

quatuo~

vires interiorss sensitlvae partis:

scilioet sensum oommunem et imag1nationem, aestimativam et memoratlvam. h12 These are the four internal sense. Which are requitted

tor the perfect life ot a perfect animal.

They are tteally dIs-

tinct from each other, because their formal objects are dist1nct.
Although the interior sens.s are really distinct, nevertheless, they are closely related to each other.

It was already

pointed out that oommon sense and imagination, the estimative
llIn De Sensu et Sensato, 1. n. 11; S. Thomae Aqu1natis In
Ar1.totaria-LIbras De Sensu et Sensato De-MemorIa et~emlnI.--
oentIa Commentarlum;-ea. ft. spiazzl, O.P7 (Taurlnt:Romae, !949),
]ra
p. 5.
__

ea.,

--

12S.T., I, 78,

4c

(ad tin.).

1)

aense and memory are complementary to each other.

Imagination

can be understood as a continuation ot the common sense; tor as
the common sense pertecta the external senses, so the imagination
perfeots and completes the operation of common sense.

The es-

timative sense, although distinct from common senae and imagination, i8 dependent on them.

The insensate intentions which the

estimative sense perceives, are in the other senses fundamentally,
for the estimative sense depends on common sense when the object
1s present, and on the imagination when the object is absent. l )
The memorative prooess cannot be regarded in isolation
either.

There exists an intimate relationship between memory

and other internal senses.

Aristotle

conslde~d

imagination as not really distinot powers.
funct10ns of the common sense.

memory and

For him they were

The imagination was a function of

the common sense, because it tollowed the total mutation of sense
which began w1th proper sensibles and terminated at the common
••nse.

Memory, thought Aristotle, belongs ger !! to the erimum

aensitivum or theaenlus commun\s, because it is in tne part of
the soul which knows luagn1tude and. time.

And this, according to

1)ttconting1t taman quod diversarum potentla.rum eat una quasi
radix et orlgo allarum potentla.rum. quaX"Ulll actus actum. ipsius
primae potentiae praesupponunt. sieut nutritlva cst quasi radix
augmentatlvae et geneX"ativae potentiae, quarum utraque utitur
nutrimento. Similiter autem sens •• communis est radix phantasiae
at memor1ae; quae praesupponunt aotum sensus oommunis." In De
Hem. et Rem.; 2, n. 322 (edIted with In De Sensu €It Sensato;-i i i nOte"'"Ir).
- -

Aristotle, is the common sense. 14
St. Thomas abandons the teaching of Aristotle on this point
to tollow Avicenna who had demonstrated that memory and imagination were two powers distInct trom the sensus communis:
Posset autem. alicu1 vlderl quod ex hIs quae hic diountur,
phantasia et memoria non sunt potentiae distinotae a sensu
oommuni, sed aunt quaedam pasaiones 1psius. Sed Avlcenna
rationabI1iter ostendit esse diversas Eotentlas. Cum 'enIm
potent!ae sensitivae sin~tus oorporallum organorum,
neoesse est ad diversas potentias pertlnere reoeptlonem
tormarum sensibl11um quae pertlnet ad sensum, et oonservationem. earum, quae pertlnet ad phantasiam slve imaginationom; slout in corporallbus videmus quod ad allud prinoiplum
pertinet reoeptl0 at oonservatio: humida enim sunt bene reoaptiva, siooa aut.met dura bene oonservativa. SimilIter
etiam ad allud prInoipium pertinet reolpere formam, et oonservare reoeptam per sensum at Intentionem aliquam per sensum non apprehens&M, qu~ia aeat1mativa perciplt etiam in
alil. an1malibu., vis autem memorativa retinet, culus est
msmorarl rem non absolute, sed pro~t est in praeterito
apprehenaa a sensu vel 1ntellectu. 5
Aristotle arrived at the conolusion that memory was a

funct~

14In D., Memoria et Reminiscenti. Aristotle says: It Now , one
must cognize magnItude-ana motIon 6y'means of tne same faoulty by
whioh one oognizes time {i.e., by thatwh!oh is also the facultY'
of memory]. and the presentation [involved in such oognition] is
an affection ot the sensus communis, Whence this follows, viz.,
that the cognition ot these objects (magnitude, motion, time] is .
effected by the [said .enaus communis, i.e., the] primary tacultr
ot perception. AcoordInily, memory'[not merely ot sens1ble, but)
even ot intellectual objects involves a presentation: hence we
may conolude that it belongs to the faoulty of intelligence only
incidentally, while d1rectly and essentially it belongs to the
primary taoul~1 ot sense-peroeption." De Memoria et Reminiscentia
1 (4$0 a, 10-14), The Student's Oxford Aristotle, trans. and ed.
w. D. Ross (London;-r9~~), Vof. j. [fhe~e are. no DlmWers tor the
pages In thIs edt tionl. cr. In De Mem. at Rem., 2, n. 319: also
Edmund Joseph Ryan, C.PP.S., !lielI2!! 'o.fth'i"'!'ensus Communis !!!
~3~ PsycholoQ .2!!!. Thomas AgUinas (-e-ariliigena, OhIo, 19:;:£), p.
15 rn De 14em. e~ Res., 2, n. 321.

of the sensus cOtJ¥1lunls because he thought that time was a common
sensible and was perceived by the sensus
.. . oommunis.
.

It also should

be remembered that the common sense in Aristotle's psyohology i8
synonymous with the sensitive soul. 16
This, however, can be interpreted oorrectly.

Since the

co~

mon sense is the root and origin of the imagination and of the
memory (tor both presuppose and are dependent 1n their act1vity
upon the act of the common sense), imagination and memory may be
called eassiones of the oommon sense.

But this does not prevent

them from being distinct powers of the soul.

By saying that

memory i8 a modiflcation (2as810) of the first sensitIve power,
its dependenoe upon sensation and Its relationship to it is

shown~

but th1s does not mean that it 1s not a distinot power. 17
The relationship of the common sense with memory having been
discussed, the next point to be taken up 1s the relationship
existing between memory and imagination.
The.e two (imagination and memory) are alao distinct trom
eaoh other, as it is proved in the

§umma,. I, 78,

4.

Yet because

of the close sImilarity ot function, there can easily arise contusion in an effort to d1atlngu1ab them.

17S_Q. S! !s., 13 ad 18: -[olum potentiae animae 81nt proprietates quaedam, per hoc quod dioitur memoria esse pass10 primi
sensitlvl, non exoluditur quin memoria sit alia potentia a sensu;
sed ostenditur ordo .ius ad sensum. d

16
As was shown above,18 Aristotle thought ~mory and imagination were merely modifications of the sensus oommunis and as such
not really distinct from each other.

That there is a olose oon-

neotion between memory and imagination is evident also from the
fact that the images of memory over a period of time tend to deteriorate into the images of the imaginative power.

And mere

imaginings, trom having been told too otten, oome to be believed
as historioal events 01' onets own past.

Thus imagination may be

talsely turned into memory.
How does St. Thomas distinguish imagination trom memory?

At

this point the discussion of the differenoe of function could be
introduoed, for, as was sald above, the confusion in trying to
distinguish these two powers arises ohietly trom the olose simil
ity 01' function.

But as this problem shall be discussed in the

ohapters on the funotions of memory, there is no need 01' going
into it now.

At this plaoe it oan be noted, however, that St.

Thomas does distinguish them and holds that they are really distinct powers.

The chiet reason for this distinction lies, of

oourse, in the differenoe of their formal objects.
obJeot of imagination is sensible

fo~s

of absent objects, while

that of memory is intentions of absent objects.
18 a generio word.

When

mod1~1ng

The word "absent"

"intentions", it applies to

time and can be specified to mean "past."

1801'. pp. 1,3.. 15.

The formal

For memory does not

11
abstract the absent intentions from the relation of time, as does
the imagination with the sensible forms, but reproduces them in a
definite setting of past time: "Memory is a power that apprehends
the past."19
So far the distinction between memory and the common sense
and between memory and 1magination has been discussed.

A fe.

words must be sald on the distinction ot the correlative powers ot
the soul, the estimative sense and its treasury, the memory.

The

chief problem that needs consideration here, it seems, is the
principle ot distinction.

St. Thomas seems to distinguish these

two faculties (just as he does with the other two closely related
powers, the common sense and imagination) not by the diversity ot
the tormal objects but by the different manners of operat1ng.
In the article of the Summa, a part of which was reproduced
1n the beginning of this chapter, St. Thomas lays down the principle that operations which cannot be reduoed to one principle
require distinct powers, since the power of the soul is nothing
else than the prOXimate prinolple ot the operations ot the soul:
"Et quaecumque harum ac tionum. non possunt reducl ln unum prinoipium, requirunt diversas potentias: cum potentia animae nihil
aliud sit quam proslmum principium operationis an1mae. M20 But
what is the nor.m to determine whether or not an action can be

19s.T., III, 85, 4, ad 3.
20§_!., I, 78, 4 c (1n1t.).

--

18
~aduoad
chapte~,

to one

powa~?

Prom what he says

f~the~

in the same

it seems that the standard of distinguishing the powers

of the soul is the

natu~e

ot the operation itself: "Recipere au-

vsm

et retinere reduountur 1n corporallbus ad diversa principia:

~am

humida bene reolpiunt, at male retinent; e contrario autem est

~e

siocis.

poralis,

Unde, cum potentia sensitiva sit actus organi cor-

opo~tet

esse aliam potentiam quae reoipiat species sen-

sibilium, at quae conservet."21

Since to reoeive and to conserve

cannot be reduced to one principle, these acts require diverse
powers, the estimative sense and memory.
~is

Did St. Thomas abandon

own principle that powers are 'distinguished by acts

and

acts

PY objects?22
Cajetan, commenting on the summa, I, 78,

4,

says that st.

rhomas is using here two principles of distinguishing the internal
senses.

One is the multiplication and diversifioation of opera-

tions aooord1ng to the needs of a perteet animal, the other
according to the nature of the operations themselves:
{P]onuntur duae radices distinguendl ao multIplicand! potentias anlmae. Pr1ma est de multipllcations actionum: scillcet, tot oportet ponere actiones, Q.uot ad perfectam vitam
animalis perfecti sufflciunt. Probatur: quia natura non deficit in necessariIs; neo etiam abundat supertluis, quia
nihIl otiose agit. --Secunda est de habItud1ne dlver.itatls
aetionum ad diversitatem potentiae: scilIcet, actiones quae
non possunt in unum reduc1 principium, exigunt diversas
potentlas. Et probatur: quia potentia anlmae nihil aliud est
quam prox1mum principium operatlonis ipslus animae. --Et

......

2lS.T.,- I, 78,

4 c•

.

22Ibld •• I, 77, 3 c; the passage was quoted on page

6.

19
sunt haa vera. radices, quia causas terwlt diversiticandi
potentias, oum sint propter actus. 23
Cajetan thinks that the manner of operating is a source (radix)

ot the diversification of powers.
same as the act of receiving.

The act of retaining is not the

Therefore, there must be two dis-

tinct powers to perform these acts.24
Although St. Thomas does not say explicitly that the acts of
receiving and retaining are further specified by their objects,
nevertheless, when he speaks ot these operations, he does refer
to their objects.

Thus he says:

"Est aut em considerandum quod

23cajetanu8, "Commentarii Thomae de Vio Caietani" in Bancti
Thomas A~ulnatis o~era Omnia lussu imPensaque Leonis XIII P.M.
{ftomae, 882-), Vo. V (:i88Q), p. 257.
24The rest ot Cajetan t s oommentary is as follows: "Dicit
ergo, ex prima radice, quod in animali perfecto aunt duae actiones
necessariae, soilicet non solum recipere, sed retinera. --Probaturt quia oportet apprehendere rem non solum praesentem sed abBantam. Probatur duc.ndo ad impOBslbile: quIa aliter non appetaret et movetur ad abaens. Et tenet sequela: quia appetitus et
motus animalis oognitionem sequitur.
Ex seounda vero radioe, quod haec duo opera non aunt eiusdem
oorporei principii. Probatur: quia bene recipere est humidi, bene
retinere est sicci. --Et s10 sequitur prima conolus10 subservien$
conservativae virtutes aunt aliae a receptlvis.
Delnde rursus ex prima radioe dicit: In animali perfeoto aunt
necessariae duae actiones, soilicet non solum circa sensibilia ut
sic, sed circa intentiones insensatas, ad commodum et utile suum
Bpectantes. --Probatur: quIa animal non solum movetur propter
delectabile aut trlstabile secundum sensum, sed propter commodum
et utile suum. Probatur quoad tristabile, in fuga ovis respactu
lupl: quoad delactabl1e vera, in collectione paleae hirundinis in
respectu ad constructlonem nidi.
Ex seounda vero radice, quod hae aotiones non eiusdem aunt
prinoipii. Probatur ex diversitate Immutativorum: quia scilicet
ad illam. immutat sensibile exterlus; ad hanc non, sed interius. ~Et sio sequitur seounda praeambula concluslo:
Potentiae versantes oirca intentiones insensatas, sunt aliae a respicientibus sensata. tt Ibid.

-

20
ad v1tam anlmalls perfecti requiritur quod non solum apprehendat
rem apud praesentiam sensibilis, sed etiam apud sius absentiam. • •
Oportet ergo quod animal per animam sensitivam non solum reoipiat
species senslb11ium cum praesentlallter immutatur ab els; sed
etlam eas retineat at oonservet. H25

A perfect animal must be able

to apprehend an object not only when it 1s present to its senses,
but also when it is absent.

Therefore, continuos st. Thomas, it

must be able to receive the impressions when the object actually
affects its faoulties, i.e., when it 1s prosent, and also to !!tain them when it no longer affeots them, i.e., when it is absent.
-The
act of receiving is oonjoined here with the presence of the
object, and the aat ot retaining and conserving is conjoined with
the absence of the objeot.

This may be taken as an indioation

that the correlative internal senses Which are distinguished by
st. Thomas in the present article by their manner of operating,
areulttmately distinguished by their formal objeots.
In confirmation ot this conjecture, the following consideraIn the ........
De Veri tate
St. Thomas says that the
I.

tion may be offered.

genera ot the powors of the soul are doubly distinguished: (1) on
the part of 'the object; (2) on the part ot the subjeot or the
manner of operating.26
the diversity in the

--

25S.T., I, 7,
8

But it may be asked, what is tho cause ot

ma~~er

4 c (init ••
)

2f)De.Ver., 10, 1, ad 2.

--

of operating?

Is it the nature of the

21
faculty itself',

If it is, it may be further asked, as to the

cause of its being of such a nature.

Mlat has determined the

.faculty to be of this partioular nature?
self to act in a certain way?

Has it determined it-

It has not, for it is the end for

which the power exists that determines its nature.
must be taken into consideration.

So, the end

To what end is a power

dLPecte~

A power, being a potency, of its very nature 1s direoted to its
act.

But the act, according to the prinoiple laid down in the

Swama, 1s diversitied aocording to the diverse character of the
objeot to which it is direoted: n(P}otenti&, seoundum illud quod
est potentia, ordinatur ad aotum.

Unde oportet rationem poten-

tiae acoipi ex aotu ad quem oX'dinatur: et per oonsequens oportet
~uOd

ratio potentiae diversificetur, ut dlveralficatur ratio aoRatio autem actus dlversiticatur secundum diversam rationem

tUS.

DoJectl. n27

Therefore, though the manner of operation may diver-

sify powers, ultimately all diversification ot operation is dependent upon diverse objects.
Since, as was shown above, the charaoterization of objeots
~s

"present" and "absent" is valid for the real distinction of

Clle faculties of sense, the conclusion that the correlative in~ernal

senses are really distinot trom eaoh other seems to be

~stablished.

The act ot reoeiving of the estimative sense (and

pf the common sense) does not have the same object as the act ot

27s.T., I, 77, 3 c.

--
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retaining of memory (and of imagination), and therefore they are
distinct powers of the soul.
As a oonclusion to the present chapter, it can be stated
that sense memory for St. Thomas 1s a really distinot internal
sense, which means that it is not the common sense; the imagination, or the estimative sense.
approaoh.
the matter.

This, of oourse, is a nagativo

It must be supplemented by the positive exposition ot
The problem

or

extensive investigation.

mine more fully its

p~per

speoifioation ot memory still requires

The next chapter will attempt to deterobject.

CHAPTER III

THE OBJECT OF SENSE MEMORY
Since a power is known through referenoe to its aot, and the
act i8 specified by its objeot,l the problem ot speoificationof a
taculty involves not only its distinction from other faculties but
also the determination of its proper object and its proper funoIn the previous ohapter the distinction ot sense memory

tions.

trom other internal senses was singled out tor discussion.

The

purpose ot this chapter is to tind its proper object.
What, according to st. Thomas. is the proper object of sense
memory?

It must be reoalled that the proper object ot any faculty

1s detined by

st. Thomas as

a formality 01' a material object by

whioh the faculty perceives the object:

"Propr1a autem 11lud

asslgnatur oblectum. allculus potentiae vel habitus, sub oulus
ratione omnia reteruntur ad potentiam vel habitum: s10ut homo at
lapis reteruntur ad visum Inquantum sunt colorata, unde coloratum
est proprlum oblectum v1sus. n2 This formalIty is an aspect ot a
material object which makes it an object of the faculty.

Under

what formality doe. sense memory perceive the material object?

--

lDe Ver ••

--

15.

2 c (lnlt.).

2S• T ., I, 1, 7 c.

23

It can be said right trom the start that St. Thomas seems to
assign two proper objects to sense m6mory.

One is the intentions

of the estimative sense, the other simply anything past.

In the

Summa St. Thomas says that the memorative power is a faoulty which
retains the intentions apprehended by the estimative sense:

"Ad

apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non acclpiuntur,
ord1natur vis aestimatlva.

--Ad conservandum autem eas, vis memor-

ativ., quae est thesaurus quidam huluamodl Intentionum."3
aga1n 1n

B! Veri tate: "(M)emorla quae oommunis est nobis at brutis,

est 111a in qua oonservantur partioulares intentiones."4
places, however, St. Thomas says somethIng different.
Summa
,

In other

In the

we find these words: U[M]emorla est vis apprehensiva prae-

terlti."5
ae. ft6

And

And again: "{P]raeteritum est proprium obiectum memori-

The proper Object of sense memory, according to this

passage, is something past.
Since for St. Thomas sense memory is one faculty and not two,
it may be rightly asked, whioh of the two is its proper obJeot?
Is it the intentions apprehended by the estimative sense, or is it
something past as past?
Just to elaborate on the problem a little more, it can be
3~ld.,

--

I, 78,

4c

(paulo post med.).

4De Ver., 10, 3 ad 1.

5a.T., III, 85, 4 ad 3.
6Ibid., III, 85, 4 ob. 3.

--

-

pointed out that there is a historical background of influenoes
which may have had something to do with the origin of this

proble~

There were two philosophers who by their doctrine on the proper
object of memory may have influenoed St. Thomas' own idea of that
object.

These philosophers were Aristotle and Avioenna.

Aris-

totle said that the proper objeot of memory was something past.
Avioenna, on the other hand, thought that it was the intentions

ot the estimative sense.

In De Memoria at Remlnlsoentia Aristotle
_

_

.......=;..;;.;;0,..........................

says: VAs already observed, there is no suoh thing as memory ot
the present while present, tor the present is the object only ot
peroeption, and the future, or expeotation, but the objeot ot
memory is the past • ..,7

It is common usage to speak of those things

whioh are reoalled by the memoratlve power as past.

It is

1~

possible to remember the future, tor tuture is the objeot ot
opinion or expeotation.

Nor is there memory ot the present, tor

it is only the sense peroeption that knows the present.

No one

would say that he remembers a whIte object at the moment he sees
it.
tion.

Memory is, therefore, ne1ther sense peroeption nor expeotaSince it is conditioned by a lapse of tim.e, its proper ob-

jeot 1s the past.
St. Thomas, oommenting on this passage, says: ftOstend1t quod
memoria est praeteritorum."8 Then a little further he says:

7Arlstot1e. .......
De Memoria .........et Reminisoentia,
1,
"
8In De Mem. at Rem., 1, n. 307.

----- ----.......-

-------

449

h, 25-28.

"[E]jUs quod nunc apprehenditur, in ipso nunc non est memoria,
ut dictum est, sed sensus quidem est praesentis, spes vero futuri,

memoria vero praeteriti."9
doctrine

011

That St. Thomas accepted Aristotle's

the proper object of memory as true is clear from the

fact that he incorporated it into his works other than the
mentaries on Aristotle, such as the

co~

where, as it was noted
above, he affirms that memory is of the past. lO
S~~a,

For the idea of intentions St. Thomas is indebted to the
Arabian phl1r:-,,;,('pher, Avicenna.

He h1.mself, while on the subject

of intentions, rafers to Avicenna several times in his works.

In

the commentary on the first book of the Sentences he says: "[U]nde

sum1tur hic pro msm.o.ria quae est potentia sensitivae pa:vtls, quae
habet organum in postrema parte capitis, et est thesaurus intentionum senslbl1ium cum sensu, non a sensu acceptorum Islol, ut
dicit Av1cenna, lib.

lli:. Anima, part. IV, cap. IV."ll For Avicenna

the power whioh apprehends the intentions is the estimative sense,
and that which retains them is the memory.

-

In his De Anima he

saysr "Thesaurus vero apprehendentis intentionem est virtus custoditlva, cu1us locus est posterior paps cerebrl, at ideo cum contlnglt 1ntirmitas corrumpltur Id culus proprlum est custodlre has
.,

lO!_!.,

309.
I, 79, 6

9Ibld., n"

llIn I Sent., 3,

0

4,

ails, l~T,-r,p. 113.

(ad fin.).

1, a.d 2; ad. B. Mandonnet, O.P., (Pari-
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intentlones; quae virtus vooatur etiwn memorlalls, et etlam retinens. "12 14:emo:oy is the treasure house of intentions, 'whose
proper function is to retain and to pre.serve them.

St. Thomas

makes use of Avioenuats doctrine of intentions, and when he deals
with the subject of the proper object of memory, he expresses him-

self in terms very similar to those used by this Arabian philosopher.
To oome baok to the original statement of the problem: what
is the proper object of memory for St. Thomas?

Is it the inten-

tions of the estimative sense, or is it anything past as past?
Does St. Thomas give the answer to the problem?

In the

Summa there is a statement which may be of help to find a solution.

In the artiole on the internal senses Aquinas says that

the object of memory is the intentions of the oat1matlve sonse,
and then he adds: "Et ipsa ratio praeterlt1, quam attendlt memoria,
inter hulusmod1 intenttones computatur. 1t13

The memory is the

.

power of' retalnir..g the intentions, but pastness, the very ratio
Eraeter1t1, is nothing else but one of such Intentions. 14

12Av 1oenna, De Anim$, pars IV, cap. 1; transcription from the
Venioe edition
by G. P. Klubertanz, S.J. (St. Louis, 1949),
p.

or-rSoa

84·

l3§_!., I, 78,

40

(mad.).

l4There are many meanings or intentIon In St. Thomas. On
this cf. H. D. Simonin, O.P., "La .otion d t lntentio' dans ltoeuvre
de S. Thomas d'Aquin, It Revue S!! SeIe,.nees Phi1osophIque~ et The~
logiques, XIX (1930), 44>-453; andIn!i4 Hayen, s;J., t i lntentlonnei selon Saint Thomas, 2nd ad. (Pa.ls, 1954), pp. 4a:~!.

. .
.~
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Pastness, then, falls within the

gene~al

oategory of inten-

tions.

Sinoe this is so, St. Thomas is not inoonsistent when he

~efers

to the proper object ot memory in two different ways; tor

the object designated in one way falls within the scope of the
object under the

othe~

designation.

Although it may be hope-

fully affirmed that this is the oorrect answer to the problem, yet
it needs an explanation..
tention.

It must be shown how pastnesS is an in-

For this purpose it will

be

necessary to oonsider St.

Thomas' oonoept ot intentions.
It must be noted that an adequate analysIs ot the nature ot
intentions will be somewhat difficult to make.
this is the tact that

The reason tor

st. Thomas does not have any detailed and

comprehensive exposition of it in any of his works.
supposed his readers to be

familia~

perhaps he

with the technioal meaning of

intentions, and so he did not attempt any lengthy explanation ot
them.

The information about the nature and meaning of intentions

must be obtained from brief passages and incidental remarks
soattered over all h1s works.

The most adequate statement about

the 1ntentions ot the estimative sense is found, it seems, in the

Summa, question 78, article

4.

There

st. Thom.as says:

(S]1 animal moveretur solum propter delectabile at contristabile secundum sensum, non asset necessarium ponere in animal!
nisi appl'ehensionem form.arum quas percipit sensus, In quibus
delectatur aut horret. Sed necessarium est anima11 ut
quaerat aliqua vel tuglat, non solum quia sunt eonvenlentia
vel non convenientla ad sentiendum, sed et1am propter aliquas
commoditates .t utI11tates, sive nocumenta: siout ovis videns
.lupum venientem tu.git, non pl"opter indecentiam coloris vel
tlgurae, sed quas! 1.n1m1cum naturae; et similiter avis colllgit pal.am. non quia delectet sensum. sed quia est utili.

ad nldifioandum.

est ergo animal1 quod peroiplat
Et
huiu. pe~ceptionis oportet ease al1quod a1iud prinoipium: cum
perceptI0 formarum aens1bil1~ sit ex i~nutatipne sonsibilia,
non autem perceptio intentionum praediotarum. ~
Necessa~lum

huiusl1l.od:t intentionos, quas non perclpi t sensus exterior.

From observation we know that animals perceive not only forms whidl
are reoeived through the external senses, but also intentions whlch
are not so received.

From the mode of aoting the animals show

that they perceive utIlity or harmfulness of objects presented to
them.

Since these "advantages" do not cause any physical change

in the organ of the external sense, they must be apprehended by
some other sense faculty- distinct from the external sense.

'1'his

1s the estimative sense.
In this passage st. Thomas detines iKtsntions baSically in
~e~a

ot their distinction trom the sensible torms.

These forms

are sensate in nature, 1.e., apprehended by the external senses;
intentions are insensate, i.e., not apprehended by the external
~enses.

Intentions are not even dependent upon any partioular

aenae quality_
~naenaate
~s

No particular sound, color, eto., determines the

intention: the sheep experiences tear whether the wolt

gray or brown, whether it howls or

y.
~hey

~ib1e

app~aches

its victtm silent-

This indicates the peouliar oharaoter ot intentions.

Sinoe

are not apprehended by the external senses and yet are senin nature, they are called sometimes sensible per accidens.

rhis term reters to the taot that oognition of insensate 1nten-
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tions is not sensed ear

~

by any external sense.

Ordinarily and

perhaps more properly the intelligible is what is re£erred to as
sensible Rer aooiden!, but st. Thomas adds to this oategory also
the objeot o£ the estimative and disoursive powers. 16
It intentions are not perceived by the external senses, one

may wonder, what role do the external senses play in their produotion?

What is their oontribution?

St. Thomas in the commen-

tary on the first book of the Sentenoes says that these intentions
4

1

are peroeived "cum sensu, non a sensu. ,,17

V~hat does this mean?

Just as the intelleot cannot completely know the universal except
against the background ot the material Singular, so the estimative
power cannot apprehend the import, the bearing ot a ooncrete
situation except against the background of sensate apprehension.
A lamb experienoes fear only when the sensible

actually present to him.

to~

of a wolf is

There is always need of a sensible sub-

stratum with whioh the intention 1s per-eeived.

The sense data,

therefore, must be present, but the apprehension of their "mean_
ing," or the intentiona, is not determined bY' Its sensible content.

Dealing with this matter, John of St. Thomas makes a dist1nct10n Which 1s to the pOint.

He says: "[R)espondetur species in-

sensatas acaip! per sensus exteriores, non ut formaliter cogn1tas

ab e1s, sed ut virtualiter contentas in 1psis rebus sensibilibus,

--

16...............
An., 1), nne 395-.398 •
In II de ......

---

171n I Sent., 3,

4,

1 ad 2.
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quas

app~$hendunt.

Res enim insensatae oontinentur et aocipiuntur

ex senaatia, nee est neoease, quod omnla. quae oognoscuntur ab tnte11eotu vel sensu interno. cognoscantur forma1iter in externo.
sed sut"fioit in obJecto 1110 contineri, ut ex il10 aooipi pos-'
sint. R18 The external senses apprehend the intentions virtually,
not formally.

The estimative sense apprehends them formally by

abstracting them from the sense data in whioh they are virtually
oontained.
The next question about the insensate intentions is this:
how are they perceived by the internal senses?
duct of a judgment?

The power of judging particulars is attribu-

ted by st. Thomas to the

~i~ c0f51tativ~

19
to the _vis .............
aestimatlva
.;:;.;;;.;;;.;;;;;..;;;..;;:;;;..0..... of an1mals.
animal perception 01" intentions?
stinots.

Are they a pro-

in m.an, but it is denied

How does he explain the

--By a natural aotivity of in-

He says: "(A)n1malia peroipiunt huiusmodi !ntentiones

solum natural! quodam instinctuj homo autem etiam per quandam
oollat1onem.,,2Q

The insensate intentions are peroeived

by

an

innately determ.1ned power, the 1nstlnot, or the estimative sense.
This sense 1s endowed bY' nature to reoognize some presentations

ot the external senses as good for the individual, others as evil.
18Joannes a Sanoto Thoma, O.P., cur~u~ PhilosoEhicus Thomi~
t1cus, Phil. Nat., P. IV, Q. VIII, Art. " rfI, ~4.

-

19§_!_, I, 78,

-

20Ibid.

40

(ad finem).
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Is this 1n aceoI'd with experience?

It seems so, for if the es-

timat1ve senile were not determined bY' na.ture to act in a definite
way, there could not be any adequate explanation of the uniformity
and necessity of instinctive act1vity Which 1s so manifest in
animal lite.
There is still another characteristic of intentions whioh
should be bI'ought out.

Since suitability or harmfulness ot an

object are relative terms, the oognitive being in knowing them
knows both the object whioh is suitable and the subject for whioh
the object 1s suitable.

When it perceives them, it has the know-

ledge of a concrete subject-objeot relation.

This note ot in-

tentions can be called the concrete involvement of selt.

5t.

Thomas seems to indicate this in his oommentary on Aristotlets

Q! Memoria !! Remini8centla.

In order to bring out the

d1tte~ence

between the Image ot imagination and that ot sense memory, he compares the two to a painting looked at fI'om two different aspects.
He says that a senae torm (the object of imagination) ditfeI's
from an intention (the object of sense memory) in the same way
as a painting taken as a painting differs trom the same painting
taken as an image of that which it represents, or of something
previously seen and experienced.

He concludes with the following

remark:
Sic 19ltur man1£estum est, quod quando anima oonvex-tit
se ad phantasma, prout est quaedam forma reservata in parte
sensitiva, sic est actus imaginatlon1s sive phantasiae, vel
et1am intelleetus oonsiderantis circa hoc universale. 51
autem anima oonvertatur ad ipsum, inquantum est imago ejus,
quod prius audivimus aut intelleximus, hoc pertinet ad actum
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.memarandi. Et quia. esse 1m.aginem signifioat intentionem
quamdam circa formam, ideo convenienter Avioenna dicit quod
memoria respicit intentionem, imaginatio vero formam per
sensum apprehensam. 21
The 1m.age of imagination 1s a representation considered in itself',
e.g., hu.m.an face in general, a rose in general, etc.

The image of

memory is a representation of something previously experienced.
Here the obJeot is Identified as having been a part of the subjeot's oonsoiousness: "quod prius audivimus aut intelleximus,"
says st. Thomas.

In these

Ima~es

absent in those of imagination.

there is an added note which 1s
It is the note of self-involvement

A well-known human face or a rose which was seen by the subject
are examples of images with consciousness of self involved in
them.
The notion of self-involvemsnt needs a further clarification.
What is this self-involvement?

Basically, it is a consciousness

of onets own operation as well as the objeot or the thing whioh
is being known in that opel:"ation.

It is the knowledge of being

affected by the sensible object or simply of senSing a thing.
This can be explained with some simple examples, as we say, fol:"
instance, "I remember hearing Verdi's Otello," or til remember
lea~ning

that theorem in geometry."

Expressions of this kind ahow

that the subject remembers not only the object (Verdi's Otello or
the theorem in geometry), but also his own act in which the object
was presented to him (hearing or learning).
21 In De Kem. at Rem., .3, n.

.343.

Selt-involvement is

/~STO~
(V- .. LOYOLA -¥~\

\

I

consciousness of undergoing a modification or of receiving an
impression from the object.
St. Thomas brings out th1s idea quite
texts trom the

1E ~

Mem.

~

ReU4

t~l11

in some of the

To quote a few ot themr "di01-

tur memorari praeteri torum actuum.; n22

ttmemoratur allquis, quia

[i.e., that] dldiclt ab alio, vel quia speoulatus est per aeipsum;
ex parte vero sensibilia apprehensionis memoratur, quia audivit
vel vidlt, vel allquo all0 sensu percepit.

Semper enimo'WD. anima

-

memoratur, pronunolat sa vel prius audlvisse aliquid, vel sen-

!i!!!, vel intell.x~~s•• "23 And again: "memoria est praeteritorum
quantum ad no.try &Ep!:eSfltns1onem, idest quod prius senslmus vel

intelleXimu~."24

In the next lecture St. Thomas says: "aliquis

m8l1Oratur se intellexisse. ft25
From this it can be seen that "intentions" imply a much
wider field ot knowledge than may appear at first sight.

The

22~., 1, n. 3011 italics added.

24 Ib1d., 1-. n. )08;

2)Ibid.J italics added.

italios added.
25 Ibid., 2, n. 320. There is problem in the interpretation
a

of the ~d leoture. The general dootrine is that in memory we
know both the impression ot modificAtion and the thi~ ot which it
is the impression. In Aristotle the ~dification (xdeo'--~assio)
would mean not only the torm resulting but also the undergoIng,
the being atteoted or modified or impressed. Thomas tends to
inte~ret it only in the first lense: the torm resulting (~
talma); but there are still enough indioations ot the passivity,
the undergoing, the being attected. E.g., n. 345: "motus phan.
taamatum"; "ex ll'll1:ttUtatione sensus."

35
standard examples ot intentions which St. Thomas constantly uses
are suitability and harmfulness, fear of a wolf and love of one's
mother.

Since St. Thomas says that these as absent are the ob-

ject of memory, a superficial reader may wonder at times whether
what is reoalled by the sense memory is only suitability, harmfulness, fear, love, and the like.

It must be remembered that

these are only examples of intentions.

The general category of

insensate intentions implies a muoh greater variety than appears
at first sight.

One can think of objeots apprehended whioh are

neither harmful nor suitable.

They may be indifferent.

apprehensions intentions, or are they forms?

Are such

The answer may be

this: if they possess the note of concrete involvement of selt,
they are intentions.

If they do not, they are for.ms.

\Vhen the

sense forms are reoognized as a part of the subjeot's own experience, in which the known is not merely the sensible forms but also
the operation through which these torms a:re apprehended, they are
not forms but torms with an intention.
taken not sua images, but

gu~

They are sensible tmages

representations of something the

subjeot identities as his own experience or knows with the note
of concrete self-involvement.
To sum up what has been said about the nature of the intentions in qUGstion as the objeot ot

memo~,

it oan be stated that

aooording to the present investigation these intentions are found
to belong to the oategory of sensible Eer
sensate in nature.

~ooidens

and to be in-

It has turther been found that in sensing the

3,6
intentions the animal has a concrete knowledge of tho involvement
of

se~f.

It knows the object as it affects it. i.e., whether the

object is suitable for it, or good, or evil.

This implies a con-

crete knowledge of the subject-objeot relation.
Is pastness such an intontion?
It has been said already that, although st. Thomas does not
e;:plain it in greater detail, nevertheless, he sa.ys explicitly
that "ipsa ratio p:I'aeteriti," the very character of being past,
"inter huiusmodi intentiones computatur," is reckoned 'among suoh
intentions, namely, the intentions apprehended by the estimative
sense, such as suitability,

har~ulness.

and the like.

then, is an intention and not a mere form...
acteristics of those intentions?

Pastness,

Does it have the char-

Is it insensate in nature?

The

answer is in the affirmative.

Pastness is not per!! apprehended

by any of the external senses.

But it is sensible, because it is

assooiated with time, and is peroeived by tho sensitive being.
Thus, it belongs to the category of sensible :eel'

~coldens,

and as

such can be ranl{ed among the insensate intentions: "inter huiusmodi intentiones computatur."
Is there in pastness the note of concrete involvement of self?
oes an individual in recognizing some past experience perceive
somehow his own involvement in it?

It seems that he does.

In or-

der to reoognize a past event the sensitive being must know that
this event is an item of

h!! past experience.

could be no roal recognition.

In the

Sun~a

Otherwise there

St. Thomas says that

37
animal memory extends in two direotions: it remembers the objects
of past experience and also the subjeotwhich had that experienoe.
Here are his words: fI[A]nimal memoratur se prius sensisse in praeterito, at se meneisse quoddam praeterltum sensibile"u26

In a

real recognition the element of selt should be somehow perceived.
it 1s perceived is another question which Vlill have to be
-How
explained eventually. It will be treated, however, in the chapter
on the funotion of reoognition, and therefore there is no point
of going into it now.

For the present it is sufficient to indi-

cate that in the reoognition of past events the sentient being
must be aware of his own concrete involvement in the process.
This demonstrates that pastness is an intention similar to suitability and harmfulness and other intentions apprehended by the
estimative sense in whioh the note of concrete involvement of
selt 121 also present.
Now that St. Thomas. doctrine about the nature of insensate
intentions has been seen, the final
problem must be given.
memory and not two?

& xplanation

How is there only one

of the original

object of sense

St. Thomas says that memory is the treasury

of intentions, and also that its prOpel" object is sornething past
as past.

It has been suggested in the beginning of this oha.pter

that these two are really one and tho same thing with two names or
looked at

f~om

two dIfferent aspeots.

Is this true?
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It has been shown that pastness is an intention just as
suitability and harmtulne.;;s are intentions.

The word ttintention"

is" then, a generic terln.; it is a genus, while pastness, suitability, harmfulness, etc., are its species.

It is clear that

intention and pastness are not coextensive, tor in every object
reoognized as past there is an intention, but not every intention
contains the characteristics of pastness.

But it must be

r8ma~

-

bered that the object of sense memory is not all intentions of
the

6~timative

aense, but only those whose objects are absent.

This puts a lim1tation on the intentions to be included under the
title of proper object of sense memory.
to the intentions of absent objects?

How is pastness related

It is not difficult to see

that all intentions of absent objects really belong to the individual's own past and not to his future.

Once the object which

oaused the perception of an intention is removed from consciousness, the intention that remains 1s a vestige of a past experience.

The intentions of absent objeots are apprehended by the

sentient being with the note of pastness.

These two (the inten-

tions of the absent objects and the note of pastness), then, seem

to stay together.
Can

So

mere sensible form be an object of sense memory'?

It

seems that it oan, provided it is reoognized as past experienoe.
Since pastness is an intention, such a form is apprehended under
the aspeot of an intention, and therefore is not a mere form any
more, but a form within an intention, and as suoh can be the ob-
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ject of sense memory.
Since the intentions of absent objects are past, and since
pa.stness itself is an intention, it can be _aid that these two
are coextenslve, so that where one Is, there the other is as well.
In this sense, it may be hopefully affirmed, the note ot pastness
and the intentions ot the absent objects are really one thing.
The difference of names comes from the difference ot aspects from
which it 1s considered.

An~

thus,

st. Thomas· seemingly dlfferent

statements on the proper object of sense memory can be reconciled.
There Is but one pI"oper object of sense memory..

It is the insen-

sate intentions of absent objects, to the category of which belongs also the :roatio Eraeteriti.

Since st. Thomas says that

pastness is that aspect under which sense memory attains the object,27 pastness can be taken as the formal object of sense memory.

But since pastness itself is an intention, st. Thomas cor-

rectly calls sense memory the treasure house of intentions of
this kind: M[T]hesaurus huiusmod1 1ntentionum. u28

27S.T., I, 78,

-- •
28

-Ibid

4c

(mad.).

CHAPTEH. TV

THE FUNCTIONS OF SENSE MEMORY: RETENTION
Two things have been disoussed wlth regard to sense memory
in St. Thomas: its distinotion fl"om other internal senses, and
its proper object.

The present ohapter and those that follow

will treat of the funotions of sanse memory.
What does sense memory do?

.

In the Summa, after havine; pointed out that the insensa.te
intentions a.re apprehended by the estimative sense, st. Thomas
says that they are Rreserved in the memorative power: "Ad oonsorvandum autem aas ordinatur vis memorativa, quae est thesaurus
quldam huiusmodi intentlonum. n1 And ln the De .................................
Ver1tate: "(Mle~
oria quae oommunis est nobis et brutia, est illa 1n qua oonser-

-

vantur partioulares 1ntentlones. n2

Sense memory is a treasure

house of intentions, 1.e., a place where the insensate intentions
are retained.

The act of retaining or preserving, then, is a

funotion of sense memory.

Sense memo:tty also reealls the intentions to aotual considera....
t10n aft$r they have been storad.
l~.!.,

I, 18,

--

4 c.

2De Ver •• 10, 3 ad 1.
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There are two ways in whioh

recall can be had: spontaneously and discU!'sively.

Spontaneous

recall is common to mon and animals. the disoursive is proper only
to men: "Ex parte autem memoratlvae, non solum habet homo memoriam,
siout oetera anima.lia, in subi ta reoordations
etla~

p","a~terl torum;

sad

reminisoentlam, quasi syllogistioe inquirendo praeteritorum

memoriam, seoundum lndividualas intentlones.«3
Moreover, sense memory is the power which apprehonds the past,
i.e •• reoognizes something as past experienoe: "Est vis apprehensiva praeteriti. n4

And again: "Animal mcmoratur se prius sonstase

in praeterlto et sa sensisse quoddaIll praeteritu...'7l scnsibile. n5
In terms of its functions sense memory oan be defined as the
power which retains, recalls, and recognizes the object of past
experienoe.
This enumeration of the operations of sense memory forms a
logical pattern according to which the treatment of the functions

can be oonveniently presented.

The act ot retention, therefore,

shall be discuesed rirst, then that of recall, and finally the
aot of recognition.
But there 1s still another operation Whioh is treated by St.

Thomas in connection with sense memory, and which was not mentioned in the above enumeration.

4 o.
4Ib1d., III, 85, 4 ad 3.
5Ib1d ., I, 79, 6 ad 2.
3S.T., I, 78,
.

-

It is the act by which the

original impression 1s reoeived.

Betore the sensible speoies are

retained or reoalled or reoognized, they must bereoeived.

The

aot by whioh the Insensate intentions are reoeived into the storehouse of memory is presupposed in all the three subsequent acts ot
sense memory.

Although the reception ot original impressions Is

not oonsidered by st. Thomas as a p.ttoper funotion ot memory, nevertheless he spends some time talking about it when dealing with
memory, and hence a few words must be said about it here betore
~aking

up the presentation of St. Thomas' doctrine of the proper

funotions of sense memory.
In his oommentary on the De Memoria et Reminiscentia st.
.......

.

.......

J.

Thomas shows that the act ot reoeiving is not a funotion ot sense
memory.
~hual

Expla1ning Aristotle he 8a78t "Px-imo ostendit [Philoso-

quod acceptio non est memoria, quia ille qui aooipit non

Secundo ostendit, quod nec e convex-so memorarl est
laoceptl0, eo quod 111e qui memoz-atur non de novo aoc1plt. rr6 Recep~emoratux-.

tion is not an act of memoz-y. because he who receIves an impression
does not remember it.

The very notion ot receiv1ng excludes the

notIon ot remembering; tor the act ot memory presupposes a pre~ious

aot to which it reters, while reception does not, as St.

rhomas does aa71
~um

"(alum

allquls primum addlscat vel patlatur quan-

ad apprehensionem sensitivam, nullam memoriam tunc resum1t,

4, n. 352.
are
omltIid.--They will also be
~uotatlons from the same text.>

text

6rn De Mem. et aem.,

(The Italios of the Bpiaszi
omitted in all subsequent
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quia ninil resumitur nisi prius existens: nulla autem memoria
praecessit; ergo primum addiseere vel sentire non est memoriam
resum.ere."7
Reoeption is not an act

or

memory for the further reason that

memory .1s ot the past, while reoeption is ot the present: "Cum
entm memoria sit tacti, ut supra habitum est, tunc est memor.

quando notitia per modum habitus vel saltem passionis lam est in
faoto e8se.

Sed, cum tit prima passio in ipsa, 8cilicet aoceptlone

notltiae, nondum est in facto essej ergo nondum tit in hOmine memoria ... 8 MemorY' is ot the past, and unless some interval ot time
intervenes bet••en the actual reception and the recall

ot

that r ....

ception, there can be no memory.
The same idea 1s expressed even olearer in thefollowtng
paragraph: "Non en1m mem.oramur e. lnquantum in praesenti
sclentiam habemus, sed per

a8

.o~

memorari non oontingit ante factum

tempus, soilioet antequam interveniet tempus medium inter notltiam
prius extstentem et ips. . aemoriam.

Memoratur enim nunc aliquis

quae prius audlvlt vel vldit vel qualiteroumque passus tult, non
aut em nunc memoratu.r quod

!'l".lJ1C

passus est." 9

The act ot reception cannot properly be oalled a tunotion ot
sense memory, mainly because 1t is ot the present.

7Ibid.

8 Ibid.,

-

9Ibid.,

4.
4,

n. 353.
n.

354.

Thls act may
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be asoribed to those powers which know the present as present, and
these are the external senses and the two intev.nal reoeptive

.
deal with objects which are actually stimulating the faoulties at
senses, the common sense and the vis a~stimativa.10 All these

the present time.

The act of reoeiving properly belongs to them.

Memory, however, is of the past.

It", act is to preserve that which

has been reoeived rather than to reoeive.

Sense memory preserves

the insensate intentions which have been reoeived bY' the estimative
sense.
The reoept10n ot original impressions, then, is not oonside:red
by St. !homas as a funct10n of mem.ory.

Even though it 1s basic

and is presupposed in the proper aots of sense memory, yet it is
aSSigned to other faculties, not to memory.

With these remarks on

the aot of reception, the presentation of St. Thomas 1 doctrine on
the proper funotions ot sense

~mory

may tinally be started; and,

as was ment10ned before, they will be taken 1n the sequenoe 1n
whioh the,. appear in the actual process 01" remembering--tirst, the
act ot retention, then that or reoall, and ttnally, the aot or
recognit1on.
Time and aga.1n St. Thomas oalls momory a thesaurus, intentionum. The LatIn word thesaurus means a plaoe where anyth1ng (money,
-tor
instance) is laid up or kept. D1ct1onaries translate it as a
repository, a store-room, or a treasure house.

Thesaurus lnten-

,..

4

tionum. when used to describe an interior sense, may be taken as
lO~ I'fI

--

~

78

It n
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a figurative description of that sense in terms ot its function of
retaining.

In

st.

~homas

both 1m.aginat1on and sense memol"y are

referred to as thesaurus--imag1natlon l"etains in its treasurr sensible forms, memory retains insensate intentions.

There are in St. Thomas a number ot eXpressions in which
mention 1s made of the retaining function of

,~,etllOrj.

For .example:

"MemoraI'l nil aliud est quam bene conservue semel accepta; ttll
"De ratione memoriae est quod sit thesaurus vel loous consarvatlvus speeierum.; «12

retin.atJ"13

"Anima. non _mol"atur prius quam apud
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al1quld

"Vis autem memora~lva retinet.,,14

When we speak ot the act ot retain1ng we generally reter to
that period in the p:rooesa 01" remembe:rtng whioh 1s put between the
original "ception of the species and its actual recall.

During

this time a vestige ot the first impl"esslon is kept in memory in
a subconsc1ous state.

It stays there until it is brought back to

the surface ot consciousness, in ox-der to be recognized as an item
of past experience.

What does st. Thomas say about this period? How does he explain the act ot retaining?
Aquinas takes up the question in the third lecture ot his
11 In De Mem. at Rem., 1, n. 302 •

............

~

--..........................

.~.......-.-

l2S• T., I, 79, 7 c.
13De Var., 10, 2, ob. $"

14In De Mem. ...............
et Rem., 2, n. 321 •
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commentary on Aristotle's B! Memoria

!! ~R_em1
__n_i~._o_e_n_t_i_a.

It is

true that what he expresses here is his interpretation of Aristotle.

In order to know hIs own doctrine on the matter, it will

be necessary to back up these comments with references to his

or1ginal works.

Th1s w111 be done as extensively as the avail-

able evidence will permit.

Generally speakIng, the doctrine in

the commentary does not differ signIficantly from the doctrine
found in the original works.
St. Thomas begins the third lectUIte by saying that a certain
impressed affection remains ir:. m.emo17 after the speoies have been
originally received by the senses.

Ha says:

Dicit [Ar1.totales] ergo primo, man1f'eatum. esse quod
oportet intel11gere aliquam talem passionem a sensu esse faotam in an1ma, at in organa corporis an1matI, cuiua quidem.
animae memoriam dicimus esse quemdam quasi habi tum, quae
quldem pass10 est quasi quaedam pictura, quia scil1cet se~
sib1le 1mpr1m1t auam sim!l1tudinem In sensu, et huius similitudo remanet in phantasia etiam .ens1b1l! abeunte. Et ideo
aublung1t quod motus quI fit a senaihili in sensum, 1mpr1m1t
in phantasta quas1 quamdam t1guram senslb1lem, quae manet
senstb!ll abeunte, ad modum quo 1111 quI sIg11lant cum annuli. imprimunt tlguram quamdam 1n cera, quae remanet etiam
sigillo vel annulo remoto.l5

From this passage several Ideas should be singled out for further
elucidation and discussion: the impression is not made, as St.
Thomas says, on the soul alone, but also on the body; honee the
question of the bod11y organ arises.
preserved in sense

memo~

in the manner of a habitus; henee the

problem of sense memory as a habitus.
l5Ibid., 3, n. 328.

Moreover, the impression is

Finally, this impression

is said to be like a picture whioh resembles the object from
"""hich it ha.s been obtained; hance a further problem of' the preservation of an impression in the torm of a picture.

This last

idea leads St. Thomas to point out the distinction between the
functions of- sense memory and of imagination.

In the paragraphs immediately

following~

st. Thomas concen-

trates on the problem of the bod1ly organ or the ooniunctu.m on
which the impression is made.
The impression, because it belongs to sense, 1s not made on
the soul alone, but on the coniunctum or composite of soul and
body: "Dicit (Philosophus] autem, in anima at 1n parte corporis:
quia cum hulusmodi passio pel'tineat ad partem senai tlvam, quae
est actus organio1 corporiS, huiuamodi passl0 non pertinet ad
solam anlmam, sed ad ooniunotum. u16 That the body plays So part
1n :i?eta1ning the species can be seen from tha fact that various
bodily disposItions are responsible for the detects of memory.
Siok and drunk persona have weak memories. Why? Because they
a~e "in multo motu. q17 It is clear that an impression cannot be
retained in a rapidly flowing substance.

So, it the body 18 in

great motion, it also retains poorly; "[P]ropter hu1usmodl causas
corpus hominls est 1n quodam f1UXUt at ideo non poteat retinere
impressionem quae fit ex motu rei sensibilia, siout contingeret
•

16~., 3, n. 329.

-

l7Ibid.) 3, n, 330.
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a1 al1quis motua vel etiam slgillum impr1meretur in aqua.m flu...
Statim enim propter fluxum deper1ret f1gura. n18

entem.

The same effect on memory Is had also when the motion 1s
found in the soul.
flux,

a~

If the soul happens to be in the state of

when it is moved by anger or oonoupiscenoe. memory Is

affeoted in the same way as it is by the motion in the bOdy.19
What does St. Thomas have to say about the organ of sense
memory?

In the

S~

he says explicitly that species are pre-

served in an animated bodily organ: "[S]pec!es enlm eonservantur
non in parte anlm.ae sensitiva. tantum, sed magis in coniuncto; cum
via memoratlva sit actua orga.n! cuiusdam.. H20 And again in the l2.!
Veri tate: "Quantumlibet enim allquls 8cientiam in habltu habeat,
laesa tamen organa 1maglnatlvae vlrtutls vel memorativae, in actu.
exire non potest."21

And in another place in the

B!

V.ritat~r

"{C]um necessarium sit humidltatem praeclpue in cerebra abundare
in puerls, in quo vis imaginativa et aesttmatlva et memoratlva et
senlus communis organa sua hAbent • • • ft22

Sense memory and all

the other interior senses have their organs in the brain.
What is the signif10ance of the bodily organ tor the function
18 Ib1d •

-

19Ibid.

20.§..!_, I, 79, 6 ad 1 •.

--

2lDe Ver •• 10, 2 ob.
22Ibid., 18, 8 o.

7.
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ot sena6 memory?
First of all, it is ee:rtain that the bodllr organ does not
exclude the ability to retain torms.

The bodily organ

S!!

the

power to retain speoies, tor even the nonliving beings have the
capacity to hold, at least tor 'a time, the torms impressed on the
This is true

~

fortiori with living beings, and especially with

oognitive powers, as St. Thomas insists in the Summa. 23
But, lt this association with m.atter does not keep sense
m.emory tram retaining epecles, it has something to do ln determining

the nature of its functions.

At least, it imposee some ot

the characterist10s ot matter.
St. Thomas says that the bodily organ ot sense memory 1s in
the brain.

But the brain, tor 8t. Thomas, i8 some kind ot watery

substanoe.

In the

~e Verita~e

he saysl "[I]maginativae virtutia

organum, et memorat1vae et oogitativae, est 1n lpso oerebro, quod
est locus summae hum1d1tatls 1n corpore humano. u 24
moisture in the brain varies with individuals. 25
water, others less.

The degree ot
Some have more

The qualIty of the body, i.e., whether the

body is 80tt or hard, whether in motion or at rest, determines the
capability to reoe1ve and retain the 1mpressions.

A hard body re-

ce1ves the impression. with diff1culty, but it retains them well.
23~.! •• I, 79,

24.e! !!£.,

----

6 c.

18, 8, ad S.

2S.......
Mom. --.
et ...........
Rem., 3, n. 334•
In De ..........
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while a body which ls soft receives easily but retains badly.
Now, since the organ of: sense memory 1s a substanoe with
varying degrees of wa.ter in it, it is olear that the more water
it oontains, the less retentive it is, and conversely.
st. Thomas sa.ys in the

!l!

And so

Xerltate that the reason why the young,

generally speaking, do not have good memories, is that their brain
contains a great amount ot water: ft[P]ropter abundant lam humidltatls quae est 1n puerIs, magIs impedluntur actus harum virlum .
[1m.aginatlvae, memorativae et cogitativae virtutIs] quam sensuum
extemorum. nZb

The tluctuating state ot young people's bodies

acoounts tor theIr ability to reoeive impressions easily and also
for their disability to retain them well.

Too much moisture in

the brain, then, has a negative etfect on memory.

The same etfeet

is had also when the substance ot the brain 1s hard and unyielding, as, tor instanoe, when man's body becomes rigid beoause ot

great tear, or beoause of natural hardness to reoeive sttmull. 21

26D& Ver., 18, 8, ad 5; the same idea 1s elaborated in tne
commentary-on the De Memoria et Reminisoentia: n{S]eoundum aut em
complexionem tluentrs corporiS; natura!Iter eompetit i111s [puerIs} ut sint labI1is memoria.. Sublungit (Phl1osophua] autem quod
similiter propter praedlota, neutrl videntur esse bene mentOres:
neque 1111 qui aunt multum velocia apprehenslonis, neque 11li qui
aunt multum taroae. 1111 enim quI aunt multum v.looes, sunt magi.
hum1d! quam oportet. Hwnid1 enim est tacile reolpere impressioneSt 1111 aut em, qui sunt magis tard1, aunt etlam magis duri) et
1deo veloeiua non remanet 1mpressl0 pnantasmatls in anima. tDuros
autem non tangit,t 1d eat non reoipiunt phantaamatis ImpressIone~n
-In
....... De Mem. et Rem•• ),- n. 332 •

- ........

~~

27Ibld., ), n. 331.
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These, in

gene~al,

are the ways in which St. Thomas speaks ot

the bodily organ of sense memory and ot the part it plays in the
act of retaining the species. 28

As regards the act of retaining,

two basic problems stlll remain to be solved, namely, the meaning
of what St. Thomas oal1s "habitualis quaedam conservatio phantas-

matls,"29 and the distinction of sense memory from imagination in
terms of the act of retaining.
Sense memory is sometimes called by st. Thomas a habitus or a
9.uasi-~ab1tus

or a power which has a habit, as when he says, for

instance: ft[Iln ipsis Interioribus v1ribus sensitivis apprehensivis [possuntl poni a1iqui habitus, seoundum quos homo tit bene
memoratlvus vel oogitatlvus vel lmaginativua. M30 The word
••

28 St• Thomas' theory on the bodily organ ot sense memory, even
though it may at first sound a bit naive and scientifically tar
outmoded, nevertheless, in its basic notions is not contra~y to
the tindings ot modern investigations. This is not the place to
compare St. Thomas with the modern theories on memory_ However,
it "1' be noted in passing that St. Thomas' idea of sense memory,
and more in particular, the role and plaoe ot its bodily organ, is
quite In accord with what the present day soientists and philosophers have to say about it. To quote Father Robert Brennan on the
point: "From the findings of soience, it is eaar to see how memory
depends on the brain. Even without the benefit of the vast programs of research that are being pursued today, St. Thomas was weD
aware ot the basio relation of msmory processes to the cortex.
Thus, seven centuries ago he pointed out that lesions ot cortioal
substanoe may have a decided effect on both Imagination and memory
and aotually prevent the recall of previous knowledge.*' Robert
Edward Brennan, O.P., qeneral PSlchol0sY, revised ed. (New York,
1952), p. 195.
.

-----

--50, 3

29.......
De Mem. ......,
et Rem., 3, . n. 349 •
In ........
30~.I., I-II,

ad 3.

habitus, as used here, means a quality of a power by whioh it 1s
disposed to aot in a certain way, and thus has a different meaning
than the word habitualis when this latter is used to define the
nature of retaining.

Since at this point the discussion oentera

on the nature of retaining, it will be out of place to indulge in
an explanation of sense memory as having a habit or a disposition

to aot.

This will be discussed later (in the last chapter of the

theSis).

Here, the meaning of the term habitua11s when referring

to the act of preserving species, must be investigated.

In his l!l

122

~emorla ~~

Reminiscentia St. Thomas says: "(PAle-

moria est habitus, idest hab1tualis

quaed~

conservatio phantasma-

...

tis.")l

And again: "Memor1am
aut em [Phllosophus) nom1nat habitum
.
,.......................
partls huius {sensitivael. quia memoria est in parte sensitiva: et
.

in ea quae in memoria conservamus, quando que non actu apprehendimus, sed quasi hab1tualiter tenemus."J2
The last quotation gives a olue as to the meaning of the
teohnioal term habitua11s.

St. Thomas says here: "non aotu ap-

prehendimus, sed quasi habitualiter ten.mus."

This indioates that

Aquinas 1s thInking ot the function ot oonserving the speoies 1n
terms of aot and potency.

-

word aotu.

He

opposes the word habltualiter to the

What does this mean?

St. Thomas never explains this

fully 1n conneotion with sense memory.

31In
Mem. et Rem., 3, n. 349 •
...... De ....................
32Ibld., 3, n. 329.
~

-

~

But he does explain it
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when he deals with the act of conserving in the intellectual
ory.

me~

Even though st. Thomas I theory on intellectual memory is

different from that on sense, nevertheless, there is some analogy
between them; a.nd, as regards the act of retaining, the doctrine
on intelleotual memory may throw considerable light on the act of
retaintng in sense memory,
St. Thomas explaIns the conservation of the intellectual
speoies in the ,§u.mma In an artIcle on intellectual memory..

There

he says: M[S]pecies IntellIg1bI1Is allquando est in intellectu in
potentIa tantumt at tune dicitur intellectus esse in potentia.
Aliquando autem. secundum ultlm.am oompletionem. actus: at t'WlO in..
telllgit actu.
actum: et tunc

Aliquando medio modo se habet inter potentlam at
dielt~

esse Intellectus in habltu.

Et secundum

hune modum Intelleotu8 conservat species, etiam quando actu non
Intel11g1t."33

When intelligible species are only potentially

present to the intellect, the intellect 1s said to be wholly 1n
potency.

At other times the species al"ecompletely actuating the

intelleot;, then 1t 18 simply in act.

But the Intelligible speoies

may be p:x-esent in a condition midway between pure potency and complete act; then the possible intelleot is said to be

lB

habit~.

It 1s in this habitual condition, between potency and act, that
the intellect keeps acquired intelligible species when they are

not being used in actual understanding.

--

3ls.T., I, 79, 6 ad 3.

st. Thomas may have a similar explanation in mind for the re-

tention ot sensible species in sense

memo~.

Sense memory, after

it has reoeived the impressions, 1s not in pure poteney any more.
It retains some determination of the original impression.

But

this determination is not present to consciousness at all times.
It does not actuate the potency completely, and so the power cannot be said to be oompletely in aot.

Since it is not completely

in act, and since it is not in pure potenoy either, It must be
in the mid-state between aot and potency.
habIt':!!_

'nlis state is oalled a

Thus sense memory assumes the oharacter ot a habit, i.e.,

ot a state midway between complete aotuality and pure potenoy.
And the words, then. quoted above: "non aetu appl'ehendlmus, sed
quasi habItua1lter ten.mus,· can be taken to mean this mid-state
between act and potenoy_
In other places st. Thomas uses similar expressions.

Speak-

ing ot how the past 1s apprehended, he lIays: "Oum a1lquis aut em
habet 801entiam habitualem et potentlam senslt1vam sine actlbus
vel operationibus eorum, tunc dlcitur memorar1 praeteritorum
actuum.".34

Discussing the difter-enoe between reception and re-

tention on the aense level, st. Thomas says that in sense powers
"allud est reolpere Impresslonem, quod taoit sentire in aotu, at
aliud retlnere, quando etlam resaotu non sentluntur. n.35

.
34m
De .em. .,.........,........
et Rem., 1, n • .307 •
..........................

35Ib ld.,

-

2, n. 316.
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Now, a still
must be solved.

turthe~

problem conoerning the act of

~etaining

It 1s the problem of oonserving the phantasm in

the sense memory in the torm of an Image.
St. Thomas deals with this poInt in the second halt of the
third lecture in hIs oo.mm.ent&ry on the £! Memoria .!! Reminisoentia.
There he makes the famous distinotion between the two aspeots of
the phantasm: the phantaSlll in itselt and the phantasm as a representation of something previously seen or experienoed.

By means ot

this distinction Aquinas distinguishes between sense memory and
imagination.
The basI0 reason tor distinguishing these two powers is, ot
oourse, the differenoe ot tn.ir formal objeots.

This has been

disoussed in the second cbapter of this thesis.

Now, the question

comes up again.

On aooount of the olose similarity of funotion

(for both sense memory and imagination are the powers whioh retain), there arises a problem of whether or not the act of
ta1n1ng 1s the same for both imagination and sense memory.

~e

The

uestion, then, is: Are there two different functions of oonsering the sensible speoies, each

~or~esponding

senses whioh retain, or only one?

to the two interior

It must be noted that th1s

uestion is not put in this way by St. Thomas himself.

It has been

ormulated thus, having in mind the difficulties that some of the
intevpreters of St. Thomas have run into when dealing with the
otion of' retaining.
atar.

The opinions of these men will be presented

Now the arguments of St. Thomas as they appear in the third

lecture ot the

1a B!

~moria

The question that

!1 Reminiso0ntia

will be given.

st. Thomas (oommenting on Aristotle) 1s

putting to himself here is how an absent thing oan be

remembe~d

if what is known in sense memory is the present impress!on. 36

Having presented some objections, he prooeeds to answer the original question.

He gives an example of a painting oonsidered under

two different aspects, namely, a painting taken as a painting, and
the same painting taken as an image of what it represents.

He

says:

(Plotest asalgnarl quomodo contingat et accidat hoo quod dictum est, scilicet quod allquls ,entiat passionem pl'aesentem
et memoretur rem absentem. Et induolt[Phl1osophus) exe~
plwn de 8..L.'1.ima.ll quod ping! tur 1n tabula, quod quidem et est
animal piotum et est imago an1malis veri. Bt, oum idem subieoto sit cui conveniunt haec ambo, d1tferunt tamen haec duo
ratione; at ideo a11a est oonalderatloeius Inquantum est
animal pietum, et alia inquantum est imago anil1lGli8 veri; ita
etlam et phantasms. quod est in noblspotest acolpl vtl prout
est allquod 1n se, vel prout est phantaama alterlus. J7
A painting consldered as a llkeness differs from the same painting
considered in itself, i.e., without the reference to the likeness
of the thing which it represents.

On tho basis of this example

st. Thomas goes on to distinguish between the mnemonic image and
the image o£ the imagination.

He says.: ItEt seoundum se quid em est

quoddam speculatum, oirca quod speculatur intellectus vel pbantasie. quantum pertinet ad partem sensitivam.

Secundum vero quod

est phantasma alterius quod prius senalmus vel lntelleximus, sic

36Ib1d., 3, n. 335.
37 Ib id., ), n. 340.
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consideratur ut imago in allud duoens 6t prinoiplum memorandl."3 8
The phantasm cons1dered in itselt pertains to the imagination, but
the same phantasm considered as a representation pertains to sense
m8mo17_

The mnemonic image points to a thing which we have seen

or understood in the past.

Thus, 1n knowing a phantasm as a re-

presentation ot previous experience, even though it 1s present to
us, we can know in it absent things.

But this does not seem to be the ba.sic problem under oon...
sideration.

St. Thomas ooncentrates here rather on the difference

between imagination and .ense memory.

The three paragraphs whlch

tollow are devoted to this problem, parts ot which oan be repro-

duced here:
Et 1deo, oum. anima memo~etursecundum modum phantasmat1s, 8i anima oonvertatur ad Ipsum secundum se, sio vldetur
animae ades•• vel allquid 1ntell1Clb11e quod 1ntelleotus in
phantasmate Insploit vel simplioiter phantasma quod vis
1maglnativa apprehendlt. 51 vero anIma oonvertat se ad
phantasma Inquantum. est phantasma alterlus, at oonslderet
ipSUD1 tamquam tmaginem 8ius quod prius senstmuB vel Intellex1mus, ut diotum est ciroa pioturam. • • , haeo iam est
alla passio huIus considerationis, quIa videlioet lam hoo ad
memoriam pert1net.
• • • Sic
• • 191tur
• • • manif.stum
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
est quod quandoani.ma. convert1t se
ad phantasma, prout est quaedam forma reservata in parte sensltlva, s10 est actus imaginatlonis sive phantasiae, vel
etlam intellectus conslderant1s 01roa hoo universale. 81
autem anima convertatur ad ipsum inquantum est Imago eIus
quod prius audIvlmus aut Intellexlmus, hoo pertinet ad aotum
memorandi. Et quia ease imaginem s1gnlficat intentlonem
quamdam oirca formam, ideo convenienter Avioenna d101t quod
memoria respioit intentlonem, imag1natl0 vero formam per

•

-

38 Ibid •
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sensum apprehenaam. 39
Sense memory 1s distinguished trom imagination not only by
reason of the different aspects ot the phantasm Wlder whioh these
two powers oonsider the phantasm. but also by reason of the different aots by whioh they attain those aspects.

When the soul

turns to the phantasm as to a form preaerved in the sensitive soul

the phantasm as

then this act is that ot the imaginat1on.
then it is the

When the soul turns to

to a representation of some pz-evious experienoe,

.!2!

of the sense memory.

It 1s not clear from these passages that the acts reterred to
are the acts ot retaining.

-

Rather, the words oonvertatur and con-

vertat !! indicate that st. Thomas 1s thinklng here of the tune.
tlon of recognition or at least ot reoall.

However, 1n the last

paragraph ot the third lecture it is stated that this distinotion
pertains also to the act ot retaIning.

St. Thomas says: "[Mlamor-

1a eat habItus, idest habituali. quaedam oonservatl0 phantasmatls,
non quldem secundum selpsum (hoc enlm pertlnet ad vil'tutem. 1mag1nativam), sed Inquantum .phantaema eat 1ma.go allcuiua prius sen8at1."4o Memory pr-esel"Ves the phantasm in a manner which 1s callet

by st. Thomas habitual, 1.e., midway between complete actuality and
p~e

potency_

But th1s preservation is not that or imaginatIon.

Imagination retains the phantasm 1nasmuch as 1t is a phantasm;
)9~.,

), nn. 341-3.

40Ibid., 3, n.

-349.
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memory, inasmuoh as it 1s a
experience.

rep~esentation

ot our own

So, the aot ot retaining ot sense memory

from that ot the imagination.

p~evious

!! different

This difference is based ultimately

on the differenoe of objeots: sensa memory retains the phantasm as
an image, while the imagination retains it merely as a phantasm.
It seems that St. Thomas makes it quite clear here that both
sense memory and imagination are powers which retain.

Neverthe-

less, this point has been oalled into question by writers on
Thomistio psyohology.

Hence, betore oonoluding this chapter, it

will be useful to reproduce the opinions of some ot these men.
In his recent book,

~

PhilosoEhl

2!

Human Nature, Father

G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., put forth his opinion that the retention
of past estimations is suffioiently explained by the retention ot
an impressed speoies through the function of imagination.

He ar-

gues tI'om the faot that the memorative power does not have an immanent image.

Father Klubertanz says:

In the conoluding discussion of the imagination, we argued that the act ot the imagination involves an immanent object, really d1st1not as term from the operation whioh produces it; this immanent objeot 1s oalled the image. Can a
similar argument be used to show that the memoI'atlve power
also has an immanent objeot (namely, the concrete relation 01'
good and evil)1 Now, the argument that the image is an immanent objeot has two p~ts: (a) an appeal to the direot immediate experienoe of the image; (b) an argument that in the
cases of absent or nonexistent sensibles (for example, the
hippogryph) there must be something which we imagine. In the
case of the memorative power~ it does not seem that an 1~
manent objeot is experienced. The retention of past estimations 1. suffioiently explained by the retention of an impressed s12ecies. In those oases where we I'emembeI' the estimations a~out absent objeots, the object known is perhaps
the image of the imagination. A difficulty against an ~
.manent objeot in the memora:tive power is this, that 1t is
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very' hard to see how concrete relation {that is, good or
ev1l) can be expressed without its term.s-and the terms are
evidently in the imagination. Beoause of the obsourity of
this problem, we will leave it unsolved.4l
Father Klubertanz thinks that since there is no immanent objeot in
the memorative power, and since this object is retained in the
imagination,

th~

power to retain would seem to belong properly to

the imagination,

But, as Father Klubertanz says at the end of the

passage. this is an obscure problem, and therefore he prefers to
leave it unsolved.
Father Robert E. Brennan,

a.p.,

in h1s

~ticle

"The Thomistio

Concept of Imagination," propounds an interpretation of St •. Thomas
which 1s quite in opposition to tha.t of Father Klubertanz..

Father

Brennan seems to think that there are images both for imagination
and for memory: "[8]in08 the knowledge of estimative power is the

primary principle of memory, then the images of memory Pe-present
the insensate 1ntentions ot sensible Objects.

The phantasms ot

imagination, on the othe~ hand, a~e always sensate in nature. n42
Even though the

memo~ial powe~

can extend to the

tempo~al

identification ot the phantasms of imagination, Father Brennan
thinks that, i f memory did not perform its own speoific function

ot recording the biologioal situations in which the animal finds
itself, then it oould not be distinguished as a separate power.
p. nubertanB,' S. J., ~ PhilosoEhZ
(New York, 1953), p_ 139-140.

41 aeorge

.2!.

¥um.an !fature

42Robert E. Brennan, O.P., "~he Thomistio Conoept of Imagina~
tiOD," 159.

Imagination, working in conjunction with the estimative sense,
would be sutficient to meet the demands of animal 1i£e. 43
So, in

~'1ather

-

-

Brennan's opinion, there is a record1ng of the

biologioal situations (in other words, of the insensate intentions}
as there is also a separate power which performs this recording
through its own specific function.
One more opinion c&.nbe presented.

Mr. Rudolf Allers in his essay on "Intellectual Cognition,"
published in Essays

~

Thom!sm, has some remarks on the problem.

Discussing the capacity of the internal aenses to retain and recall, he compares the modern usage of the words "memory" and "1m.agination" with the terminology ot

st.

Thomas, and sayst

Reproducing some kind ot image, however, is the adequate performance of the internal senses and especially of
the sense called '1maginat1on. t To be reproduced atter an
interval of time, the image has to be conserved from the
moment of peroeptive awareness until the moment when lt is
called back. The oapacity of retention and eventual recall
1s called 'memor7 f 1n modern psychology. St. Thomas, however, credits what he calls imagination with both retention
and reproduction. Memory. to him, is also one of the internal senses; but its 1'unotion is limited to adding the
torma11t7 ot paatneas to the image, that is, to endowing the
image with III peculiar charaote:o by whioh it is recognized as
reproduction. This dlfferent use of the two terms 11magination' and 'memory' has oaused some misunderstanding between
modern .mp1ricalt~nd Thomist psychologists, and should be
carefully noted.lf4

44Rudolt Allers, "Intellectual Cognition," published in EasaYS 1n Thomism, ed. Robert E. Brennan, O.P. (New York, 1942);pp. 4~5.
'
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The point to be noted here is that the funotion of sense memory
(in the Thomist sense) is limited to adding the
pastness to the image.

fo~mality

ot

The retention and even the recall is the

function of the imagination.
In the light ot these conflioting interpretations of

st.

Thomas, one thing becomes clear: the distinotion between the
functions of sense

~emory

and imagination is a knotty question

which hardly admits an absolutely clear-out solution.

And a re-

mark as that made by John of st. Thomas, namely "quod manloria sit
conservativa, nullu8 dubltat, alias non esset memoria, si non conservaret speoles,n45 sounds a bIt unreal.

A more realistio ap-

proach perhaps, but a rather pessimistic one, 1s that taken by
Father Klubertanz, who feels that the solution 1s well nigh

i~

possible.
Faoed with suoh admissions, it would be presumptuous to pretend to give a definite solution to the problem.

Ho••ver, one can

always try to p10k the one which 1s more probable.

From what

st. Thomas says in the th1rd lecture ot his

eo~

mentary on the ...-.-.
De Memoria at Rem.iniscent1a, it would seem. that he
~,

.

ass1gns to each power, 1.e •• sense memory and imagina.tion, a dif-

ferent act of retention.

'fhis is ex.plioitly stated in the last

paragraph where he says: "[Mlamor!a est habitus, 1dest habitualis
quaedam oonsenatio phantasmat1.s, non quidem seoundum. se:tpaum. (hoo

.
45Joannes a

S.

q. 8~ a. 2; 'O. 255.

Thoma, Ourens Philosophicus 'fhomisticua, P. IV,

enim pertlnet ad virtutem imaglnatlvam),
est imago allculus prius sensatl."46

8~d

inquantum phantasma

The imagination retaIns the

phantasm inasmuch as It is a. phantasm, 1.e"

the sensible forms.

Sense memory retains the phantasm inasmuoh as it is a representation of something prevIously experienoed.

It seems that aocording

to st. Thomas there is only one immanent image or phantasm concerved in internal sensation.47 Since imaglnation and sense memor"T are concerned with one and the same phantasm. it ean be sald
that the retention of the totality of the phantasm, i.e., with all

its aspects, 113 accomplianed through the funct10n of both sense
memory and imagination.

However, there are various aspects under

Which the phantasm 113 conserved.

These are the sensible forms and

rl

46!!,! 2! .!!!g. !! !!.!m., 3 ,
47concerning the uniclt1

n.

349.

of the phantasm Father G. Klubertanz
S.J., has the tollowing footnote in his work, The Ph110s02hZ £!
Human Nature: "Many Thomists, tollowing John ont. Thomas, Cursu.
PnItesoEnloua Thomiaticus, Part IV, q. 8, a. 4, maintain that ImagInation,' estImatIve power and memoratlve power each produce an
immanent object. • •• As far as St. Thomas ia concerned, it woule
.eem that he think. there 1s only one image or phantasm wIth which
all three ot the powers are concerned, eaoh in its own way; ot.
st. Thomas, Conw. 1n libro8 Ethieorum, Bk. ~, leet. 7 (ad. Plrotta
nos. 1214-1sr;-Teci7 9 (nos. f~-9); Bk. 2, leot. 11 (no. 381)."
The Phl1oaoI~ of Human Nature, pp. 139-40.
The un ctyoltl:ii Plian'Easm 1s hinted at in the commentary on
the De Memoria at Remin1acentla, where st. Tr~mas says: "Et 1nducitexemp1uni de aiiIma!1 q.uo(! pingitur in tabula, quod qu1dem et
est animal pictum et est imago animalia veri. Et, cum idem subieoto sit cui conveniunt haec ambo, difterunt tamen haec duo
ratione; at ideo alla est aonsideratio etuB Inquantum est animal
pictum, et alia inquantwn est imago animalls veri; Ita etiam at
phantaama quod est 1n nobis poteat accipi vel prout est 81Iquod in
ae, vel prout eat phantaama alteriua." In ne Xem. at Rem., 3, n.

340.

--- --
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On account ot the dl£ference of these

the insensate intentions.

two formalities, st. Thomas postulates different powers to apprehend and conserve them.

For the conserva.tion of sensible forms

St. Thomas postulates imagination: "Ad harum[senslblllum] autem
£or:marum rstentione.tl'l aut cons6l:'vs.tionem ordinatur pb.antasla
~maginatio,

..!.!.!.!

quae idem aunt: est auim phantasla sive im.aginatI0

quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum.,,4 8

For the

conservation of insensate intentions st. Thomas pOSits the msMorative power: "Ad oonservandum autem ea.s tintentlones quae per sensa~

non accipiuntur]

l1!

;~_e~m_o_r_a_t_i_v_a,

hulusnlodl intentionum.,,49

quae est thesaurus quldam

Thus it may be concluded that aooording

to St. Thomas there are two different acts of retention: the

1'0-

tention o£ sensible forms through the £unotion of imagination and
the retention ot insensate intentions through the function of the
memoratlve power.
As has been seen in this chapter) the proper funotions of
sense memory are retention, recall, and recognition.
function o£ retaining has been exam..ined.

So far the

According to St. Thomas,

sense memory is a power which retains insensate intentions.

Since

th1s power functions in association with a bodily organ, its acts
are at£ected by material conditions and even possess certain
material oharacteristics, as the dependence of the quality of re,

I

I

48-S•T.,
-

49Ibi d.

-

I, 78,

4 c.
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tention upon the quality of the Substru1ce of the brain.

The tunc-

tion of retention is expla.ined further by st. Thomas in terms of
act and. potency as being a habitus, a mid-state between complete
act and pure potency.

Finally, it appears tha.t accordinG to St.

Thoma.s the retention in sense memory is distinct from the retention in the imagination.

can be expected

fX'OIll

Some fur<ther clarification of retention

St. Thomas' explanation of the two remaining

functions of sense memory_

Now the nature of recall must be considered.

CHAPTER V

THE FUNCTIONS OF SENSE MEMORY: RECALL

The thesauric function of sense memory would be useless it it
were not ordered to a higher act--the recall ot the preserved speoies to the field of consciousness.

And so St. Thomas says: "[R]e-

quiritur quod ea quae prius tuerunt apprehensa per sensus at interins oonservata, iterum ad actualem considerationem ravocentur."l
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas distinguishes two kinds of
restoration processes: the first is simple recall, whereln things
are brought back to consciousness spontaneously without the aid of
any device.

This is oommon to botb man and animal.

The seoond 1s

a rationally controlled process oalled remin1scence or recollection, wherein past events are reoalled with the help and guidanoe
of reason.

Recollection is a strictly human aohievement.

On this

point St. Thomas says in the Sum.m.a: "Ex parte autem memorativae,
non solum habet [homo] memoriam, slout cetera animalia, 1n sublta
reoordatione praeterltorum; sed etial'il J;"emin1seentiam, quasi syllogistioe inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, seoundum individuales
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intentionea."2 Man has both memory, whioh 1s an immediate reoollection ot the past, and reminiscenoe, which is that recolleotion
by which man seeks 81110gistioally for the reoall or the past by

the applioation of individual intentions.

The word

~ublto

perhaps

means "immediately" rather than "suddenly,n for the aot ot simple
reoall presents the lost object to memory without the help of the
medium, i.e., the syllogistio guidance of reason, while reminiscenoe searches for the forgotten objeots through the intenentlon
and under the direotion of reason.
Perhaps the majority ot memory responses, even in man, involve nothIng more than the

rath~r

automatio reoall.

It must be admlttedthat St. Thomas does not say very muoh
about this reoall.

While he devoted to reminisoenoe five lectures

1n his commentary on Aristotle's

~

Memoria !! Reminisoenti., he

has only a tew scanty remarks on simple reoall.
just quoted trom the

Summa

Besides the one

he has a tew more elsewhere.

Thus, tor

-

Instanoe, in his De Anima St. Thomas salst n[R]ememoratlva virtu.
In alils quidem anIm.alibus absque inquisitione suam operatlonem
habet, in hominibus autem cum inquisitione et stUdio; unde in hom!nibus non solum est memoria, sed reminisoentia.")

Speaking in the

l!1 B!

ot the de-

eighth leoture ot the

Memoria

.!!

Rem.ini.centi~

liberate searoh tor past experienoes in man, he says that there is

--

2S.T., I, 78,

4 c.
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a parallel

ope~atlon

in animals which funotions as a certain ne.-

utral instinot: "(D).lib.ratio autem solis hominibus competitj
cetera vero animalia non ex «ellberatione, sed ex quodam naturali
instinctu operantur."4
Beyond such oversimplified desoriptions of the spontaneous
reoall, St. Thomas does not oblige us with any lengthy treatment
of the nature of this function.

However, he has something to say

about it in his treatment on reminiscence.

The ideas on simple

recall can, perhaps, be best pointed out in the presentation ot
the dootrine on reminisoence.

Henoe, the matter found in the flve

last lectures of the .............
In De Memoria --at Reminisoent!a oan be
med1ately taken up tor disoussion.

1~

The ideas on simple recall

will be pointed out as they oome up there.
As has been noted already, reminisoence oonsists In the rationally directed recall of past memories.
":remin1soe" or recollect in this sense.

Only

man is able to

This is a capacIty which,

in a way, transoends the purely sensory funotions of human organism, involving, as it does, the intellectual faoulties ot man.
What is reminiscence?
In

ans.e~ing

this question, Aristotle, and St. Thomas atter

him, Show first what reminisoence is not.

They distInguish it

trom other types ot knowledge whioh have a certain
it.

siml1~lty

to

These are the acquisition of new knowledge and the repeated

recovery of the same

memo~1es.

"[R]em1niscentia nsque est

Reminiscence is neither of these:

res~~ptio

memorise, 1ta quodn1hil

aliud sit rem1nisol quam iterato memorari; nsque itsrum reminiscentia est prima acceptio allouius aogno8cibl1is, puts quae fit
per sensum vel per intellectum."5
knowledge is not

~emin1scence

That the acquisition of new

is clear enough; tor, as has been

pointed out in the beginning of Chapter IV, the reception of
original impressions does not pertain to the realm of

memor~.

Memory presupposes a lapse of time, and therefore, the moment

the original experienoe and the moment of the memory
perience are never Identlcal. 6

or

ot

this .x....

It reminiscence is a type ot re-

call of East experienoes, it 1s not the same as the acquIsItion
of

~

knowledge.

NeIther is it a repeated

To recollect is not, as the LatIn text says,

recove~
ite~ato
,

ot memories.

memoroari.

In

order to recover memories, one does not necessarily need the direotion ot reason.

ot simple recall.

This oan be done, and otten is done, by means
Reminiscence is something else.

in a paragr'apb. ot the fourth lecture St. Thomas explains the
positive side ot reminiscence in the following way'
[R]emniaoentla eat ~esumptio pl'imae aoceptionis. • • • S10ut
enim memorari retertur ad prius factam notlt!am, ita et re:n1n1scl. Et tunc .est reminisol,' scilicet cum aliquo modo
resumimus prlorem apprehensionem, non autem ita quod reminiscentis. sit aliquid eorum quae dicta Bunt, vel sensus, vel

5Ib1d., 4, n. 351.
6Ib1d., 4, nn. 353-4.

-
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.mel1'lOria, vel phantas1a, vel sOient!a; sed per !'emin1scentlam
accidit memorari, quia reminiscent!a est quldam motus ad memorandum. Et sic memoria sequitur reminiscentIam,. siout terminus motum.
Vel secundum aliam literam., reminiscent!& sequItur memoriam, quia s!out inquisitio ration!. est via ad Allqq1d cognoscendum, et tamen ex a11quo procedit, ita reminiscentia est
via ad aliquid memorandUm, et ta.men ex a11quo memorato procedit, ut intra patebit.7
ReminIscence, then, 1s the reoovery of original knowledge (not the
acquisition ot it) whioh was there by.t had disappeared because it

was torgotten.
capture them..

It is the way to lost memories, the effort to reBut al though

rem1ni8c~nce

is not the same as remembering.
imply the tormer, but the
latter

(rem~b.r1ng);

ot recollecting.

leads to remeniberlng, 1 t

1'his latter does not neoessarily

to~er

(reminiscence) always Implies the

tor memory tollows upon the successtul act

st. Thomas says that reminiscence is the re-

covery ot the or1sinal !powledge.

In this it does not ditter

trom memory, tor the objeot ot memory is also the recovery ot the

orIginal knowledge: "stout enlm memorari retertur ad prius tactam
notitiam, ita et remin1acl. u8

The objects ot reminiscenoe and ot

m.emory, then, are the same.
But the assertion that reminiscence is the recovery ot the
orIginal knowledge requires qualification.

For instance, a person may learn or discover the

is reminiscenoe.

same tning twice.

-.

7Ibld. I

8 Ibld •

4.

Not every such recove

Reminiscence is not this.

nn. 356-7.

It 1s true that both

h. who recollects and he who

have lost.

~ele~ns

71
recover the knowledge they

But recollecting dIffers from relearning because, as

St. Thomas sayst "[1]11. quI rendniscitur recuperat eam [not1t1am
quam amisltJ sub ratione memoriae, in ordine scilicet ad id quod
prius tuit cogni tum; ille autem, qui Iterato add1sc1t, recuperat
eam absolute, non quasi allouius prIus cogn1t1. n9, Hecerllecting 1s
not a mere relear.ning. because recollecting is the way to knowledge which belongs to the realm ot memory, that 1s to say. it
takes its origin from the specIes preserved in memory, whilereleam1ng may have nothing to do with memory, as it can take a co~
pletely tresh start. 10 Recolleoting and relearning are different
kinds of knowledge because they proceed from different principles. ll
The tact that the principle ot reminisoence is an object
pI-eserved in memory, gives another insight into the nature of
reminiscence.

It has been said previously that the term of re-

miniscence 1s the same as that of memory.

Now it is pointed out

in St. Thomas' commentarJ that the principle of reminiscence is
also memory.

It is the species preserved in memory that sets the

acts ot reminiscence 1n motion. ' The process ot recapturing the
lost memories starts from other memories which are not lost.

6, n. 372.
lOIbid., 6, n. 373.
llIb1d., 6, n. 372.

9Ibid.,

-

-
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Hence, reminiscence, in so tar as it has to do with knowledge, belongs to that category 01" cognit1on whioh 1s proper to memory.
beg1ns w1th memory and it ends w1th memory.

It

It is a part of the

memorat1ve process.
The idea of the prinoiple of rettdniscenoe brings up the question of the oaUle ot reminiscenoe.

It has been said that re.minis-

OGnoe finds the stLmulus to motion from the species preserved in
the store-house ot memory.

How does this species set reminiscenoe

in motion?
st. Thomas insists that only he reoollects properly who is
able to move trom the starting point to the finish by his own efforts.

It he cannot do this of h1mself (as when he has totally

forgotten) but 1s in need of external ass1stanoe, he 1s not said
to be recollecting. but relearning or merely learning for the
f1rst ttme. 12 External assls~anoe is d1scarded as the motive
powett ot the aots ot reminisoence.

The beginning of movement has

to oome from within.
What is there within man that brings about the funotioning of
tteminiscence?
Aocording to

st. Thomas, the cause of reminiscenoe is the or-

der or conneotion of movements whioh has been established in the
soul when the first impreSsions were reoeived.

st. Thomas says:

"Causa autem remin1acendi est ordo motuum, qui relinquuntur in

-

12Ib1d., 6, n. 375.
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anima ex pr1ma 1mp1"'ess1one eius, quod primo apprehendtmus."lJ
Then st. Thomas deacz.1bes the nature of this order.

He says that

it is a native inolination of the soul to reproduce the representations in the ordal' and relationship ot their original ooourrence
"[R]em1n1soentiae oontlngunt per hoo quod unus motus natu. est
post alium nobis oocurrere."14

And this happens in two ways:

Uno modo, quando seoundus motus consequltur post pr1.mnm. motum ex necessitate, siout ad apprehensionem hominis sequitur
apprehensio animalls ex neoessitate: et slc manitestum est,
quod quando anima movetur primo motu, movebl tur etlam secundo. Alio vera modo contingit, quia secundus motus sequitur post primum non ex neoessitate, sed ex oonsuetudine.
quia soilioet aliquls oonauevit post hoc oogitare vel dioere
vel raoere, et tunc secundua motus sequitur post primum non
semper, sed ut ad multum, Idest ut in pluribua. siout etiam
etfeotua natyrales ut in pluribus ex suis causis sequuntur,
non .emper. l !>
The order of movements can be neoessary, or it can be custom.arl'.
In the type which is neoessa1"'7. two or more movements are so connected with eaoh other that, 1t one is reoalled, the other will
be invar1ably reoalled also.
remembers "animal."

When one remembers "man," he also

In the customary type, the connection 1s es-

tabllahed by an impress ot custom, as when, for instanoe, a certain experience has become a custom by repetition.
Reminiscence 18 not a random or accidental affair.

It ad...

vances according to the established pattern which ex1sts between

IJlbld., S, n. 3S9.
141bl~., 5, n. )60.
15Ibid •

-
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the images.

What is this pattern?

According to st. Thomas it

can be either the succession or time or the sucoession of the objects known. 16

Vinen recollecting prooeeds along a time series ot

events, it may do so, for example, by beginning with those event.
which are most reoent and gradually retrogressing to experiences
that are more remote. 17 When recollecting proceeds along the line

ot the objects known, it can do so aooording to the three laws

of

aasociation: first, the law of similarity, whioh says that like
suggest like.

Thus, when we think ot Soorates, for example, it

is easy to taink of Plato, since both were outstanding Greek
philosophers.

Next, the law ot oontrast, wh1ch states that llke

has a tendency to suggest unlike.

As tor instance, the mention

ot Hector's name may bring back the memory ot Achilles, sinoe one
was the enemy- of the other.

Thirdly, the law of proximity, whioh

says that remembering one thing brings back to memory all those
things whioh are near to it or connected with it.

The memory of

a father oan cause the memo1'7 ot the son.

The connection in this
case oan be that of association, ot space. or of t1me. 18
This, in general, is the pattern acoording to which reminiscence brings back into consciousness the lost parts of our memory.
The laws of association are oertain links which oonnect various

16 Ib1d., 5, n. 363.

-

11Ibid.
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experiences into one whole.

When a part of a previous experience

is remembered, it tends to recall the remaining parts.

This has

some practical implications tor those who want to improve their
memories.

The topio

of:

how to train one's memory, however, will

be taken up in the last chapter ot the thesis.
Concerning the cause ot reminisoence, it may be further asked
whether the order ot movements whioh has been established in the
soul with the first impression operates ot itself, or is there
something else whioh sets it in motion?
this question in the titth leoture ot the

iseentta.

st. Thomas considers

1!!

~ ~ezq.oria ~

Hemin-

He says that this order may operate ot itselt, even

oasually, but that this is not properly reminiscence.

Reminis-

cence proper is that which receives the 1mpulse to aottrom the
intelleotual powers..

On this St. Thomas says:

Est autam considerandum ulterius, quod quando que pervenltur ad motum posterlorem ex allquo priori secundum praedictum modum ab his qui quaerunt Invenire motum consequent em
perdltum, at hoc propria est rem1nlscl; quando scilicet
aliquis ex intentione Inquirit allcuius rei memoriam. Continglt autem quandcque quod etiam 1111 qui non quaerunt mamerari, propterea. quod sic procedentes ex priori motu in
posteriorem, ut dictum est, deven1unt in memoriam a,licuius
rei, cum il1e motus rei oblltae fiat in anima post al1um,
et hoc quidem erat praeter intent10nem tsedut secundum
multa,' idest in pluribus, tacti. a11is motlbus quales dlxlmus, scilicet sim111bus vel contr'ariis vel propinquis, insurgebat 111e motus qui occurrit; sed hoo abusive dicitur
reminlsci. Est autem oasualiter memorari secundum simil!tudlnem quamdam reminiscentlae. 19
19Ibid., 5, n • .;366; the sentence ttContingit aut em• • • "
seems to-bi def:ective. A verb is missing either for i11! or tor
2ropter'e~

.9.!!29:.

Reminisoenoe proper supposes some sort of intellectual aotivity.
It the recall oocurs unintentionally, it is "abusively" oalled
reminisoence.
The distinotion between proper and improper reminiscenoe is,
perhaps, the distinction between the simple recall and the recall
which bears the name at reminiscence.
not say

80

Although St. Thomas does

explioitly, yet, when h. reters to that type of re-

minisoence whioh Is casual or nonlntentional, he seems to be
talking about the same recall ot which he makes mention in the
Summa. as the ~ublta r.c,ordati~ :era~teritorum,20 and in

I!l!. Dt.euted gUestion £! A;nima as th! reoall which is aocomplished .!2.!'"
~ue Intentione. 21

As 1s olear trom the quotation, the "abusive"

or improper reminiscenoe (or the simple reoall), Just as the reminisoenoe proper, is the return of obJeots to awareness by reason

ot the relation between the images.

But in the Simple recall this

oomes about automatically, without a conscious effort, while in
reminisoence 1t is aohieved consciously. with the help of reason
and w111.

Thus the maln d1fference between the simple recall and

reminiscence seems to be the absence or the presenoe of intellectual guidance in the searoh tor forgotten objeots.

The first il

common to both men and animals, the seoond 1s proper only to men.
The faculty exercising the function of reminiscenoe comes to

--

.

2OS.T., I, 78.
2Ig.~.

2!
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4 c.
13 c.

77
the very threshold ot intelleotual aotivity.

It searohes for the
lost objeots ot memor,y by means ot syllogistic reasoning. 22
Nevertheless, reminiscenoe as such does not enter the sphere ot
intellectual operation strictly speaking.

Its aotivity 1s con-

tined to partioular representations, and the universality required tor intelleotual knowledge is completely lacking.
St. Thomas says that reminiscenoe is a search
events according to lndlvidua,l Intentlons. 2,3

S~

tOI'

In the
torgotten

Besides, In the eighth leoture of the,!!! l2! !4emoria

~

l!!l!!-

nisoentia St. Thomas shows that reminisoenoe is not an intellectual actIvity by proving that it operates in a bodily organ.

That

reminiscence 113 a searohing for an image in a corporeal substance
is demonstrated by the taot that when a person is unable to remember, he experiences the teeling of unrest.

This restlessness

ma'1 perSist against his will, as it frequently happens in persons

ot melancholic

t.JIp.~ram.ent.

'fhis is a sign that reminisoenoe

operates 1n a bodily organ, for only the passions ot the body
cannot be stopped at will.

St. Thomas ooncludes that reminiscence

i8 an aotivity ot senaea u510 ergo patet quod reminiscentia est
carporalis passio, nee est actus partis intellectlvae sed senslt1vae, quae .t1am in hominG est nobl11or et virtuoslor quam in
22,!!! .lli!

.!!m• .!! '!g•• 8, n. 399.
2.3!.1_, I, 78, 4 c.
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o.liis an1malibus propter coniunetionem ad 1ntelleetum."24. ReIn

man it is elevated by

reason ot its association with intellect.

But this association

min1scence 1s properly a sense power.

is external, for it consists only 1n guiding or helping.

Reminis-

cence proper belongs to sense, since, as has been said, it involves movement from one particular image to another.
So tar several notes of the nature ot reminiscence have appeared.

Reminiscence is the process or tna way to actual re-

membering; its prinCiple is the various speoies preserved in
memory and the order among these speoies; its object is the same
as that ot remembering; and finally

ra~nisoence,

functions in connection with reAson,

neve~theless

even though it
it properly

belongs to sense.
Two more questions remain to be considered in this chapter:
the distinction of the act of reoall in sense memory and imagination, and the question whether or not reminiscence 1s a faculty
distinct from the faculty of sense memory.
With regard to the problem of the distinotion of the aot of
recall in sense memory and imagination, first it may be inquired
Whether

r~call

properly belongs to the powers which retain or to

those which apprehend.
A brief discussion of this question is found in John of St.

Thomas.

Commenting on the passage in the DisEuted

24..............
Mem.
In De .........-..

et Rem., 8, n. 408 •
....................

Suestio~

B!
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Anima cited in the beginning of this chaptel' and more particularlyon the words: "{R]equiritur quod ea quae prius fuerunt appre-

hanaa per sensus et interlus conservata, iterum ad actuale.m con...
slderatlonem revooentur, n25 John of St. Thomas says that "maxims
pertinet ad memoriam ipsa excltatl0, qua aliquid revocatur seu
lnciplt habere actualem oons:tderatlonem. n26
belong to memory?

l~rny does exoltstion

Can, perhaps, the reoal1 be caused by some

other power, whioh 1s distinct from memo17, tor instanoe, the
apprehensive powers?

John of St. tpbomas answers that the excita-

tion must be performed by the

re~1n1ng

taoulty, beoause the

species which cause the recall are in the power which retains
them, and not in the power which apprehends them.

To quote John

of' St. Thomas:
Nee poteat diei, quod excltatl0 fit non in ipsa potentia
oonservante speciem, sed in potentia apprehendente, quae est
distlncta ab ea, quae oonservat apeciem. Nam eontra est,
quia ipsa excitatio non tit nisi utendo speeie. Ergo al ln
potentia apprehendente non datur species, sed in conservante,
non poterit ipsa apprehend.ns exoitarl, nisl prius per aliquem. IlOtum talis determ.inata. speoies transteratur a potentia
oonservante ad apprehendentem. Quomodo autem potest transmittl i11a species a potentia eonservante, 81 non oognoscit
aut disoernit quaenam species transmlttenda sit ad talem
e:x:oitatlonem?2.,
Sinoe the species must be used to bring about the eXcltation, recall must take place in the power which has the species in its

2SS.~. ~

!a., 13

o.

26c,ursus Philoso:ehioq~ Thomistieu8, P. IV, q. 8, a. 2; p. 256.

-

27Ib id.
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posseasion.

The apprehensive powers do not

fore recall is not their proper function.

sto~

species; there-

Reoall properly belongs

to the powers whioh retain and these in the sense psychology of
St. Thomas are memory and imaginatIon.
Now, the question arises: is the reoall or sense memory distinot from the reoall ot imagination?
It seou that aocor4Ing to St. Thomas they are distinot.
Speaking in the third lecture ot the In

De

..............

Memoria et Reminisoen.........

I

1!! of the different tormalities under which imagination and sense
memory attain their Objects, St. Thomas uses the word oonvert1t ! !
[anIma] which suggests the idea ot reoal1.

And there are two such

recalls or "turnIngs" of the soul: "[Q]uando anima convertit se
ad phantasma, prout est quaedam torma reservata 1n parte sensitlva,
sio eat actus 1magination1s sive phantas1ae. ••

51 autem anima

convertatur ad Ipsum Inquantum est imago eius quod prius audlvimus
aut intel1ex1mus, hoc pertinet ad actum memorandi. ft28

When the

soul turns to the phantasm under the aspect ot 1ts being a representation of sensible forms, then th1's turning 1s an aot of imagination.

But when 1t turns into the phantasm under the aspect ot

its be1ng a representation of our previous experienoe, then it 1s
aa aot ot sense memory.

The differenoe of acts is ultimately ex-

plained by the d1fference of formal objects, which for imagination
is a sens1ble torm. as absent, and tor sense memory an insensate
•

41
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intention aa abaent.
Does St. Thomas ever speak ot reJl'l1n1scence as a separate
power distinct trom sense memory1

4 ob. 5.

In the Summa, I, 78,

he conslders the poss1billty ot

positlng reminiscence as a separate power.

ae says:

Praeterea, actus cogltatlvae, qui est oonferre et co~
ponere et divldere, et actusreminlsc1tlvae, qu1 est quodam
aylloglsmo uti ad lnqulrendum, non minus dlstant ab actu
aastlntativae et memorative.e,quam. actus aest1mativ&.e ab actu
phantastae. Debent ergo vel cogitative. et reminlscentia
pon! aliae vire. praeter aeatlmatlvam et memoratlva.m.; vel
aeattmatlva et memorative. non debent pont aliae vires praetel'" phantaalam.
Reminiscence, because ot the guldance received trom the intellect,
1s so ditterent from other internal senses, that it seems to be
reasonable to have lt as
ternal senses.

Ii

separate power distlnct trom other In-

st. Thomas answers the objectlon ln the tollowing

way: "Ad qu1ntum dieendum quod illam eminentlam habet cogitatlva
et memorativa ln homlne, non per 14 quod est proprium aensltiv.e
partls; sed per allquam attlnltatem et propinqultatem ad rationem
universa1em.. secundum quandam retluentiam.

Et ideo non sunt a11a.

vires, sed eaedem, pertectlores quam sint in a1ils animalibus."29
The oogitative sense and reminiscenoe are the powers in man with
a certain excellence which the brutes laok.

But as far as they

are powers ot sense, they do not differ trom the estimative and
the memoratlve faculties in man.

Henoe, they are not new powers

added to the soul of man, but are elevated on aocount ot the more
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perfect informing principle whiah 1s the rational soul, whioh,
throUgh its rational power, can .uae thom in a rational way.
John at st. Thomas has this to sayan the point:
Sequ11iur tertia cogi tatl.vam et reminiaoentiam in homine
non dlstingul ab aestimativa et memoria, sed ease ipsamet
potential cum quadam pertectione participata ex con1unotlone
ad rationem, secundum quam disourrere possunt circa sua obiecta singularIa, quod quidem pertinet ad 4iversum modum 0perandI, non ad diversam potantlam, quae solum ex diversa
tmmateria11tate obieoti dlversificatur per se. ODd. eadem
potentia intellectus procedlt et sine disaursu in actibus
primorum prlncipiorum, at cum d1scursu in a1iis sine variatione potentiae, et appetitus sensitivus in nobis participat
aliquid llbertatiS, ut docet D. Thomas in 1. 2. q. 74. art_
), et tamen non est alia potentia specie divers a ab appetltu
sensltlvo nonhabente talem. llbertatem..30
The parallel powers--the cogitative and the estimative sense, and
reminiscence and memor7-are not distinct potencies, tor potencies
are divel'sitled accord.ing to the difterences in theltt formal objects.
powers.

Mere difference of operations does not divettsif1 the
Thus, tor example, we have various types of intellectual

operation, and yet only one intellect.
Both sense memory and reminiscenoe have the same tormal objects.

In thIs they are not distinot.

is their manner of operating.

What is difterent 1n them

Pure sense memory attains its ob-

ject without the aldot reason, while reminisoence attains it with
the guidance ot syllogistio interence.
essential to memory as such.

But this guidance is not

It is accidental.

And therefore the

differenee between them. is in the accidental order.

As sense

300ursus Philosoehlcua ~hom1stioU8, p. IV, q. 8, a. 2; p_ 257

8)
powers reminiscence and aense memory do not ditter, and hence St.
Thomas concludes: nEt ideo non sunt a11ae v1res, sed eaedem, pertect10res quam sint 1n allis animallbus. u31
However, the name "reminiscence" is sometimes used to denote
the power ot sense memory in man, Just as the cogitative Is used
to denote the estimative In man.
Cajetan, oommenting on St. Thomas explaIns thIs thus: "Convenientla est in aetione senauum respeetu senslbll1um: et eius
ratl0 est similiter tmmutarl ab els.

-DIfferentia est in aetlo1:'le

re.spectu Intentlonum: et quoad apprehensivam, quia cetera instlnctu, homo collatIon. apprehendit; et quoad retentivam, quia cetera
aublta reoordatione, homo inquisitivo

dIsc~su.

Und. et nOminibus

etiam dlfterunt, dum ll10rum aestimativa in nobis eat oosltatlva.1

et memoratlva est ~m1n\8~entia.ft32

The cogitative and the memor-

atlve powers in man are different from the oorresponding powers
in animals by reason ot their association with the intellect.

Hence, we are justified 1n calling them by
the memorative power 1n man may be called

dlffe~.nt

names.

~.miniscence,

the estimative in man is called the cogitatIve.

Thus,

just as

In this sense

mini8cenee i8 a faculty, not a mere function of a faculty.

~e

But

this, of course, does not mean that reminiscence i8 a new memora-

4.

ad

5.

!_!., I. 78,

4,

VII, in Sanctl ThoWje Agu1natls ~erV
vIo Caietan , O.p. (Romae, ,

31~.!., I, 78,
32~n

Omn:ta t cwil conun.entarlis Thomae de
(188~JI p.

257.
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tlve potencY' which 1s distinct trom the sense memory in man.
is just a dirterent name for the same thing.

It

There i6 only one

memorative power in man whioh is the sense memory and whloh sometimes 1s oalled reminiscence.
More properly, however, reminiscence meallS the act ot recall,
rather than the potency.
ative power proper to man.

It 1s one of the functions of the memorThis ca.n be seen from the definitions

st. Thomas gives of reminisoenoe, as, tor instance, in the commentary on the Q! Memoria

!!

~eminiscentia:

"[Rlemin1soentla nil

est aliud quam inquisltio aliouius quod a memoria excidlt";33 and
again: "[R]eminisoentia est resumptio primae acceptionls. n34 Reminiscence 1s the act by whioh we recall forgotten things.
The function ot recall--either the d1soursive recall, whioh
1s reminisoence, or the nondlsours1ve. whlch 1s the simple re0&11--18 necessary to memory, beoause without it the mere retention ot apeoles would be useless.
act ot memory.

However, recall is not

lS!

It is only the way to a still higher act. which

is the actual remembering or reoognition: "[R]eminlseentia est
via ad aliquid memorandum. n35 The act of recall is the functIon
of sense memory which, having proceeded from the speoies retained
in memory, oulminates in the act of reoognition.

---

---

33In ....................
De Mem. et Rem •• 5, n. 362.
34Ib1~., 4, n • .356.
~

35~ld., 4, n. 357.

The final step
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in the memorative pz-oaaas is reoognition.

This completes the

m.ovem.ent of memory, for here the sentient being recogniz.es the
past as past.

The next chapter w111 be devoted to the presenta-

tion of what st. Thomas understands by recognition.

CHAP'l'ER VI

THE FUNCTIONS OF SENSE MEMORY: RECOGNITION
'fhe ability to recognize 1s the most distinctive feature of
sense memory.

From. experience we know that animals oan recognize

objeots and events which have occurred in their past; for instance
dogs recognise their masters.

Suoh recognition involves first 01.'

all the retention 01.' the images at the past experience, seoondly,
the actual :reoall at these images, and thix-dly, a concx-ete knowledge at the image as at a past experience.

The bare retentIon

and recall does not formally constitute an act 01.' memox-y although
they are necessary steps in the prooess.

It is rather the aware-

ness that the recalled experience 1s a part ot onets oym past
which differentiates memo!"y tram the other internal senses and
gives it its exoellenoe and worth.

"[M]emoria dlstlngu1tur pex-

hoc quod est praeterltorum inquantum praeterita aunt," says St.
Thomas in the commentary on Aristotle's £! Sensu !! Sensato. l
Thl'tough the function of reoognition a.nse memory has the
power to know that a oertain object or event has been met in the
past.

In the

~umma

St. Thomas says: ft[U)emoria est via apprehen-

lIn
De Sensu
et --~
Senaato,
.............
. .......
......... 1, n. 9•
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siva praeterlti";2 and again: "Memoria 19itur est cognoscltlva
alicu1us sub determinato tempore.")

-

In the De ................................
Veri tate: "(M}emoria secundum communem usum loquentium aocipitur pro notitia prae-

terltorum.,,4 The abIlIty otsense memory to put the image in its
proper historloal setting is the objeot of inquiry of the present
chapter.
One of St. Thomas' key statements on how recognitlon takes

---

place is found at the end of the seventh leoture of the In De Memorla !! Reminiscentia.

There St. Thomas says: "[Q]uando in anima

slmu1 occurrlt motus rel memorandae et temporis praeterltl, tune
est memorlae actus. aS

One actually remembers only when two con-

dltlons are fulfllled Simultaneously: flrst, the movement of the
object ot memory into consclousness, which is the ldentiflcation
of the objeot as our own experience; and second, the corresponding
movement of the time 1n which the ob ject has been apprehended.
which is the "dating" or the placing ot the objeot in past time.
It one ot these condltions is not verified, the act ot remembering

does not take place.

On this St. Thomas says:

S1 vero aliquis putet ita se habere, et non ita fiat in memoquia vel deest mot us rei, vel motus tempo~is. non est
memoratum. Nihil eDim prohibet quod in memore inait menda~ia,

."
2~.!., III.

8S, 4 ad

).

'Ibid., I, 79, 6, ob. 2.

4~ !!t., 10, 2

0

(init.).

SIn
De Mem. ...-.
at Rem.,
7. n. 396 •
..........................
............
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olum, sicut oum alicui videtur quod memox-etur et non memoratur, quia occurrit ai tempus praeteritum, sed non res quam
vidIt, sed alia loco 8iu8. Et quandoque aliquis memoratur
et non putat se memorari: sed latet Ipsum, quia scilicet
non occurr1t e1 tempus, sed res, qu1a, ut supra dictum. est,
hoc est memorari, phantasmati intendere alicuius rei prout
est imago prius apprehenal. Unde 8i motus rei tiat sine
motu tempori8, aut e converso, non remini8citur. O
One ~

be mistaken and think that he remembers when he really

does not.

This happens on aooount of the faot that either one or

the other ot two conditions is not fulfilled.

If one knows the

object without knowing the time, or if he knows the time without
knowing the Object, in either case he does not place an act of
real remembering.

In order to have reoognition he must oomb1ne

the two elements 1nto one act.
Identifioation of the objeot of memory as our own experience
and placIng ot this object in its proper past time are two idea.
which 8eem to be basic in st. Thomas' doctrine on recognition.

Both ot them, however, need further explanation and textual development.

The present chapter, then, will be divided Into two

parts, corresponding to the two ideas to be explained: first, the
identIfication of the object, then the placing of it in the past
time.
The identifioation of the objeot as our own experience takes
plaoe" according to st. Thomas" in the act in which the soul turns
to the phantasm under the aspect ot an image.

This image is not

the pure image of the imagination, but the recognized image of

6 Ibld •

memory.

And so st. Thomas says in the paz-a graph quoted above:

"[aloc est memorari, phantasmatl intenders aliculus re1prou.t est
imago prius apprehensi. n7 The same idea 18 repeated in other
similar expressions.
vertat~

To quote a few ot them: "S1 autal'll anima con-

ad ipSUM, 1nquantum est imago eius quod prius audlvtmus

aut intellex1mus, hoo partinet ad actum. memorand1; n8

"Secundum

vero quod est phantasma a.lter1us quod prius sensimus vel lntelleximus, sic consideratur ut imago in aliud duo ens at principium
memorandl. ft9
As the distinction between the phantasm as an image and the
phantasm as a s ausible form has been explained before f there 1s
no need to go into it here.
should be brought out.

At this plaoe, however, another point

Attention must be called to the faot that,

whenever St .. Thomas speaks of the phantasm as an 1mage of.' our experienoe, he always adds some phrase Which indioates the part
played by the knowing subject in the ident1fication of the phantasm as an image of our own exper1ence.
"imago prIus a2ErehensI,n nquod prius

--

The words to note are

auq1Y~

-

aut

1,ntellex1DM~.ft

--'""""------

In the first lecture of the In De Memoria at Reminiscent!a St.
Thomas brings out the involvement at self even more clearly.
S&7'H

He

"Semper en!m cum anima memoratur, prontmciat.!! vel prius

8Ib1d., 3, n. 343.

9!bid., ), n • .340.
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audivisse aliqu1d vel sensisse vel intellex1sse. n10
----_.----.

•

The two

$

ideas, namely, the image of our e;q>erience, and the knowled.ge

-

tha.t this image is, or that it has been, our expel"1enoe, are a1ways oonnected together.

In this St. Thomas shows that the know-

ledge ot selt 1s essential 1n the identification ot an objeot as

our own experience.
In order to identity an objeot or an event as a part of the

subject's own past, he must have some advertenoe to himself.

He

must know that he 1s the subject who has experienced that object
or event previously and who now reoalls it to oonsciousness.
There can

be

no recognition of the past without a concrete know-

ledge that the subjeot himself tormerly existed, that he was then
the same individual as he is now.
It is evident that the tullness of the knowledge of the ego
is possible only to the intellect, which has the power of proper
reflection.

The animal, however, has some knowledge ot its own

ego, too, but only improperly.

In the dootrine or St. Thomas

this function 1s performed by the common sense.

that the sentient beings have an
oont~aated

St. Thomas admits

imprope~ ~et1ect1on,

which, as

'111 th the intelleot t s complete return to 1 tsal!, has

only incomplete return; 1.e •• it knows the senslble objeots, and
knows that it know. but does not know ita own essence. ll Through
10Ibi~., 1, n. 307; italics added.

llDe v~~ •• 1, 9 o.
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the subjective unifying . funotion of the common
sense even the
.

animal has some knowledge of :tts

O\'ffi

ego.

E!. a. Thomas Asu1nas

Father Edmund Ryan in his dissertation entitled The Role of
~

tSens'1 s Communis' !!2

~ ps:ohol.o€~

ex-

plains bI'iefly St. Thomas' theory on the unifying power of the
oommon sense.

Parts of this explanation can be reoounted here.

In the ohapter called "A Synthesis of St. Thomas' Position on the
fS.ns~s commun~st,"

he says:

From the proper object ot the sensus cOllltllunis, there
flows .. twofold unification exemp11fIed In tEe proper oper...
ationa of the common sense: a) the awa.reneS8 of the aotions
01' the external ••nses and t'fU.ougb. this b) the pereaption of
the aets of the proper sensibles otthe ?tve external senses.
In the theo17 ot st. Thomas., the common sense possesses a
knowledge of the sensations of the external senses; it ettecta a d1scriminat1on ot these sensations; it ach1eves a
fJ'ynthesis of the sensations.. • ..
The tirst unifioation brought about by the common sense
is subjective--the concrete and implic1t perception 01' the
subject himaelt which occurs ooncomitantly w1th the perception ot the object. The first purpose ot the common sense
1s to give to the individual consciousness ot the acts 01'
his external senses. For this reason the sensus Qommunis is
oalled sensitive consoiousness or the intim.ate sense ..
Through the sensus oommunis I am aware that I am seeing and
that I am hearrng
tlia'E this 1s one and. the same sensing
subject. Since the aot ot one extex-nal sense is different
trom the acts ot the other external senses, to be attributed
to the same tIt they must be united. It is the common senae
whioh recognizes these acts ot the external senses as my
operations; it reoognizes these as acts of the same subjeot.
Thus the common sense 18 aware at the operations of the ex·
tarnal senses and disoriminates among them, attributing oertain moditioations to certain per1pheral organs. • •• It
should be olearly understood, however, that the .ommon sense
does not reach the permanent subject abstractly or expllclt17
that is, as dist1not trom the sensations. Consequently, the
oommon senae 1s primarily aon.cerned in a concrete and aentient way w1th the acts ot the external senaes which are the

ana
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basis tor the awareness of the subject's own existenoe and
unlty.l2
The unity ot self on the sense plane is known, in the theory of
St. Thomas, through the function of the oommon sense.

The animals

do not have an abstraot knowledge ot their own ego as do men.

But

they have a conorete awareness that the sensations whioh they are
having are theirs.

It is they who tee1 this pain or experienoe

this pleasure or see this object.

The unifying sense thus

ae~

counts, even in animals, tor the permanence of the ego, the knowledge of which is essential tor the identifioation of present
peroeption as having been experienced at somet1me 1n the past.
But now a still further question has to be asked.

How does

the identification of the reoa1led phantasm with previous experlenc. take place in the knowing subject?

a. has been po1nted out,

Acoording to

"

st. Thomas,

the identification of the objeot ot mem-

ory is the reeognition ot the phantasm as an image ot our previous
experience.
There are three ways in which a man oan identity hi s own experience in the phantasm.

Two of them are false, one 1s true.

In

the thIrd lectm-e of the ................
In De Memoria
et Reminisoentia
,........
... St. Thomas
desoribes three types ot remembering; the fIrst is had when we
doubt

whethe~

we remember; the seoond, when we really and properly
•

12Edmund Joseph R7an, C.PP.S., The Role of the 'Sensus Co~
.!a!8! P.slcholog,r p.!!!. ~homas Aquinas, pp. lli(J:j •. -

m'¥lis f
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remember; and the tll1rd, when we think that we remember but reall,.
do not.
The reason why we sometimes doubt about our msmory is the
tact that we are not sure whether the recalled Image really re-

st. Thomas says: "Aliquando enim

ters to our actual experienoe.

quamvis 1n nobis sint lI10tus phantasmatum qui Bunt taoti ab eo quod
aenaimus, qui scilicet relinquuntur ex prima immutatlone sensus
propri! a .ensibili, tamen nesoimus si accidat hoc motus esse in
nob18 secundum hoo quod prlus sensImu.s aliquid.
mu.s utrum memoremur vel non. tt13

Et ideo dubita-

Even though the phantasm 1s

trulY' representative of our actual experienoe, :ret, it ..e do not
know it as suoh, the identification of the image does not take
place.

For real identifioation two conditions have to

be

ful-

filled: the phantasm must be a representation of our ownexpel'i-,
enoe and it must be known by us as suoh a, representation.

In the third kind of remembering (whioh 1s also false), it
happens the othel' way around.

Here in turning to the phantasm

which does not reter to our past, we think that it does l'8ter to
it.

This happens because we mistake the image ot imagination to

be an image of memo17'. and hence we have a talse identittcatlon.14
To remember properly. and theretore to have a true identifi-

oation ot the

phantas~

one has both to experienoe an image ot the

13l!! £!. Mem • .!! R,e~., ), ni 345.
14l';bld., 3, n.

347.
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real past and to know that it is an 1mage 01' the real past.

St.

Thomas describes it in the following way: "Secundo vero oont1ng1t
a11quando quod hoc intelligit at remin1scitur, quia prius aud1vimua aut vidimus aliquid Quiua pbantasma tunc nobis occurrit, quod
est proprie memorar1: et hoc contingit quando ll1e qui apeculatur
phantasma movetur quidem ab ipso praesenti phantasmate, sed conalderat 1p8um inquantum est imago alteriuB, quod prius senstt vel
intelle.x1 t. nl$ He who remembers truly knows in the phantasm the
image o£ bis previous experience.

Tbia identification of the

phantasm takes place in the act by which the soul turns to it and
knows lt a.s a repl*esentatlon 01' a definite experience, not merel,.
experiences in general, ot lts own past.

Thus, the phantasm, even

though it 119 present, nevertheless in v1l*tue of its belng an image

ot previous experience, represents the real past o£ the knoWing
subjeot.
This, it would seem, 1s St. Thomas' idea of how tne

ao~called

motga rei or the identification ot the objeot 01' memory i8 to be
explained.
But the ldentification of the obJeot Is only a part ot the
process ot recognition.

Atter the image has been identIfied as

one's own experience, it must--ln order to be tully
be situated in lts proper historical time.

recogni~ed-

This 1s the other part

of the aot of recognition which has been oalled by St. Thomas

-

l$Ibld., 3. n. 346.
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motus tel1porls, or the movement of the soul to know the time in
which the object

occ~red

to us in the past.

St. Thomas expresses himself on the question of the motus
tePm0ris in various ways.

Relevant statements can be found in the

commentaries as well as in original works.

these statements are only fragmentary.

Unfortunately, most ot

They give the theory in

amall portions, never pretending to pl"esent it :1n any oomprehensive faShion.

Oonsequently. the understanding of St. Thomas' mind

in this matter is rather diffioult.

In the following pages an

attempt will be made to collect the more important passages in
one place,to unity them, and in doing so to give an interpretation of

st. Thomas f thought. Where the eV14ence will be lacking,

it will be necessary to conjeoture what that thought would be.
That sense memory implies some knowledge of time is clear
from the tact that

~mory

is a power Which apprehends the past.

Hence, in the Summa St. Thomas says: "{Mlemoria praeteritorum. est.
Sed praeteritum dlcltur seoundum aliquod determinatum tempus.
Memoria igltur est COgDOscltlva &liouius sub determinatotempore."16

It memory is able to know the past, it must be able in

some way to sense time.
Time is defined by St. Thomas as "'numerus motu.! secundum.
prius et posterius.",17

In 1ts conoept time involves notions ot

16~.!., I, 19, 6, ob. 2.

-

17Ibdd., I, 10, 1 c.

number, motion. and relntion between ordered parts.

To know

these notions and these relations as such. one needs the operation of the intellect, for only the intellect can apprehend relations as such.

Sinoe sense memory is not an intellectu.a.l powor,

it does not know time abstrac tly, i. e .. I 'U.I.'4derstanding the nature
,
of number, of suocession, etc. However, it can know it conoretely.
Commenting on Aristotle's £! Memoria .tl. Heminiscontia st.
Thomas shows that magnitude, motion, and time are known by the
faculties of sense.

In the second leoture he says:

[N]eeesse est quod eadem parte animae cognoscitur magnitudo
et matus, qua etiam cognoscitur tempus. • • •
Magnituda autem oognoscitur sensu: est en1m unum de
sensibilibus communi bus. Similiter autem et motus, praecipue Ioealis, oognoscitur. inquantum oognoscitur distantia
magnltudinis. Tempus autem cognosoitur, inquantum cognose1tur prius at posterlus In motu: unde et etiam sensu peraip! possunt. Duplleiter autem aliquid sensu peroipltur.
Uno quldem modo per ipsam immutationem sensus a sensibl11;
et sic eognosountur tam sensibilia proprIa quam etiam co~
munia a .enaibua proprIis et a sensu communi. Alio modo
cognoscitur allquid quodam. secundarl0 motu" qui re11nquitur
ex prima 1mm.utatlone sensus a aenalbili. QuI quidem motus
remanet etlam quandoque post a.bsentlam sensibilium, et pertlnet ad pbantasl&m, ut babitum est in libro de Anima. Phan~
taaia. autem" seoundum quod apparet per huius Immuta£Ionem
secundarlam, est paaaio sensus communis: sequitur enim. totam
Immutationem sen... , quae inolpit a sensibI1ibus propriIs,
at terminatur ad sensum communem.Unde manitestum est quod
praedicta tria, soilicet magnitudo, motus et tempus, seoundum
quod aunt in 'Ohantasmate, comprehenduntur et cognoseuntur per
sensum commun(l)lu.1B
The important points made here are these: magnitude and motion are
known by sense powers (not the intellect); time 1s apprehended by
sense, tOOl It is known Inaamucb as succession in motion can be
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known; sense can perceive in two ways-hy the actual impression or
the sensible upon the sense potencies, and by the species which
remain in the sense powers after the sensible objects have been
removod; the sensible :forms are retained in the phantasy, which is
an affection (a mod.ification) of the

sens1.l~

eomr.lunis; lllag;nitude,

motion, and time are retained in the phantasm and are known by
the oommon senss.
How does sense memory come in here?
in the next paragl"Jph.

ReNt he distinguishes between the intel-

leotual and senae memory.
pItehends time.

St. Thomas brings it in

But he also points out how memory a1'-

First of all, it knows time in the phantasm: "Sen-

sibilia enim postquam praetereunt, a sensu non

percipiuntUl~,

nisi

siou.t in phantasmate"J 19 secondly, it appreh.ends it a.ccording to
a deteItmined distance which is 111easured i'rom the previous impres-

sion to the present moment: "[A}d memoriam autem peIttinet appreh$nsio temporls seoundum

dlstantlam in pItaesenti

dete~lnat1onem

quamdam, seoundum. soilicet

nuno. n20

A somewhat more detailed exposition of the knowledge of time
1s found in the seventh lecture of the ..................
In De Memoria -at
RemiIlis. . .......................
centia.

Here St. Thomas shows how the various magnitudes, includ-

ing the temporal distanees, are perceived.
It must be presupposed, he ways in the seventh lecture, that

-

19 Ib1 d., 2, n. 320.
20 Ibid ..

-
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is something in us by which we distInguish between greater
and lesser periods ot time. 21 How do we do it? It is reasonable
the~e

to think, says St. Thomas, that we distingu1sh the various distanoes of time in the same way 1n which we discriminate spatial
magnitudes: "Et hoc rationabile est esse circa tempus, sicut et
circa magnitudlnes corporales: magnas qu1dem, quantum ad quantitatem corporum viscrum, at procul,.quantum ad quantltatem distantlae 10ca11s, cuI

quantitas temporls,quae accIpitur secundum distantiam a p~a.sentl nuno. n22 This knowledge ot
proportlona~ur

size. and distances 1s not a product ot our thought reach1ng out

to them, but i8 a psychlc prooess

by

whiohwe know external ob-

jects through their species lett In the soul: "Non ergo cognoscit
anima magn1tudinem . i se coextendendo, sed per hoc, quod qui4am

motu. a re senalbl1i resolutus in anima, est proportionalis magnitudin! exterior!.

Sunt 8n1m in anima quaedam formae et motus

a1m11es rebus, per quas res cognosclt."23

Magnitude. have their

representations in the intentional order, and hence can be known
by

means ot these

rep~e8.ntat1ons.

Atter this St. Thomas asks a question: "Cum an1ma

pe~

simili-

tudinem. magnltud1111a quam. habet magrdtudlnem. cognoscat, 1n quo

21 IbiS ., 7, n. 387.
22 Ibid •

23~id •• 7, n. 388.
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dlttert 111ud quo cognosolt malorem et mlnorem magn1tudlnem?~
And he answerst
(A]nlma vel per slmilem f1guram siva tormam 1ntelllg1t minora, ldest minorem quant1tatem, sieut et per formam s1milem
cognosclt m.aloItem magnltudlnem. Formae enim et Motus lnteItiores proportlonallter correspondent magnltudln1bus exterioribua, et to~te ita est de magnitudlnlbus sive distantiis
looo~ et temporum, sicut de speciebus rerum.
Unde, slout
in ipso oognoscente aunt d1versa. slm1l1tudines et motus
proportionaliter respondentes dlversls speoiebus re~um, puta
equo et boY!, Ita etiam et dlversis quantitatIbus. 2/
The point here, it would seem, is that temporal distanoes, and
even the differences between greater and lesser distances, are
known 1n the same way as the magnitudes ot bodies, i.e., through
the torms whioh are impressed on the soul by those magnitudes.
Through the torms and motions which remain 1n the soul we know
not merely the varIous sizes ot

exte~al

things, but perhaps (I)

also the magnitudes ot apatial and temporal distances.
Cajetan commenting on the passage or the Summa in which St.
Thomas deals with the virtue or hope, says that bItutes do not
have hope because the1cannot perceive future time.
know time only by

imp~esslonJ

time, not or the future.

Sense powers

and impression can be had or past

He says:

Et quonlam. non a11 ter per"c.1pl tur tempus a parte sensi tl va
nisi per Immutatlonem, ideo futurum ~epugnat perceptioni
sensItlvae. Cumenlm tempus sIt numerus motus secundum prIus
at posterlus, non alIter peroipitur sensu tempus, nisi per-

24ib ld., 7,

n. 389.

25Ib1d., 7, n. 390.

-
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clplendo quandam distantiam suooessivam ab 111a mutation. us-

que ad 111am: at sic, depiot! in parte sensitiva hac at illa
mutationa, perolpltur tempus. Propter quod, il11us tantum
temporis praeteriti meminimus, culua 1mmutatl0 aliqua depiata retinetur.20

Cajetan conoludes that Sense powers percelve only that t1me ;vlUah
leaves an iDlPNSslon on the soul.
past.

be

This cannot be future, but only

In th1s qao:b8.tion Cajetan brings out a point whIch has to

conslde~ed

next.

He says that the temporal dlstance whioh ani-

mals perceive 1s successive.

~he

succession consists in going

trom one impression to another.

From. the definit10n of time as given by St. Thomas, lt ls
clearthat auecesaion aoeording to sequence is essential to the

notion ot t1me, and hence in order to know time, one has to know
the succession in mot-ion.

On this point St. Thomas says in the

Summa: "Cum en1m. in quollbet motu sit auceessio, .t una pars post
alteram, ex hoc quod numeramus prius et posterlus in motu, apprehend.1m.us tempus ... 27 Therefore, it sense memory 1s to know time,
1t must be aware ot some kind ot suocession extend1ng to the past,
and must be able somehow to number the sucoeeding parts .•
St. Thomas otten speaks o£ the memorrfs awaX'eness which extends 1 ts gaze

tl:"ODl

the "now· to the time when the remembered ob-

jeot has been first received.

Thus, he says in the

•

26.!B 1.1., I-II, 40,
27§.!., I, 10, 1 c.

)J

v, 261-8.

2! Verltate:
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"[M]emor1a secundum propriam sui aocept1onem resplolat ad Id quod
est praeteritum respeotu huius nuno"J 28 and again: "Philosophus
loquitur de memoria quae est praeter1ti, prout est relatum ad hoo
nuno, inquantum eat hoc."29

Memory. then, knows the past as 1 t

related to the present or the "now."

It is aware of a certain ex-

tension whloh spans the temporal distance from past e x.perience tp
the present moment.

How is the soul aware of this extension?

In the commentary on Aristotle's Pgysiea St. Thomas expla1ns
this:
Oont1ngit 8n1m quandoque quod perclptmua tluxum temporis,
q~ls nullum motum part1cularem aenalbl1em sentlamus; utpote 81 a1mua in tenebrls, at al0 vlau non sentimus motum
allcuiu8 corporis exterloris, et, a1 nos non patlamur all.
quam alteratlonem 1n corporlbua nostr1s ab allquo exteriorl
agente, nullum motam oorporia aentiem.ua; ettam&n al flat
allquis motus in anima nostra, puts. seoundum successionem
cogltationum et imaginatlonum, subito vldetur nobis quod
flat allquod tempus. Et .ie pereiplendo quemcumque motum
perolpimUs tempus; et similIter e contra cum perclp1mus
tempus s1mul peroipimu8 motum.30
Time 1s peroelved w1th any motion.

And when we do not sense ex-

ternal movement but are aware of our intex-ior aots, we feel the
successive motion of these acts, and hence we are able to know
tims.

The sucoession, then, is had in the $equence of the acts

which are placed by the cognitIve being.

--

28ne Ver •• 10, 2 c.

Human beings, of oourse,

.

.lOIn IV ~il~.' 17, n. 1099.
29Ibid., 10, 2 ad 2.
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know this sequence in a more perfeot way than do animals.

level'-

theless, animals too are oonscious of their own sensations.

Inas-

muoh as they know the sucoession ot these sensations, they know a
oonorete suooessive motion.

And to be ••are ot suoh motion, as

Cajetan well observes, is to know time.
One tinal question remains to be answered: how is the past
known as past?
St. Thomas does not hesitate to affirm that sense memory
knows the past as past.

Thus in the

J2! ....V~e_r;;;..:i:;..;t_a.....t_e he says: HOlJemo...

ria secundum communsm usum loquent1um aooipitur pro notitia praeteritorum.

Cognosoere autem praeteritum ut praeteritum, est eius

cuius est cognosoere praesens ut praesens, vel nuno ut nuno; hoc
autem est sensus. H3l

!!2!
tully.

the past as past is known,

st.

Thomas never e:xplaina

The olosest that he oomes to an explanation ot this prob-

lem 1s, perhaps, the question in the

whether the intellectual

~mory

Summa

in which he inquires

can know past as past.

Here he

says something on sense memory also:
[P)raetar1tl0 poteat ad duo r.terrl: scilicet ad obieotum
quod oognoaoitur; et ad oognItion!. aotum. Quae quldem duo
simul ooniunguntur in parte sensltlva, quae est apprehenslva
a.11cuiu.s per hoo quod immutatm- a p~aesent! sena1b111: unde
simul animal memoratur se prius sellaiase in praeten to et se
a.nslsse quoddem praeterltum .enslbile. -Sed quantum ad
partem intellectlvam pertlnet, praeterltl0 aooldit, et non
per se oonvenit, ex parte obleot! intellectus. Intellig1t
en1m intelleotus hominem, Inquantum est homo: homin! autem,

--

31De Ver., 10, 2 o.
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lnquantum est homo, accldlt vel in praesenti vel in praeterlto vel in futuro esse. Ex parte vero actus, praeterltio
par se acelpi poteat etiam in Intellectu, sicut in sensu.
Quia intelllgere animae nostrae est quldam particularls actus J
in hoe vel in il10 tempore exlstens, secundum quod d!eitur
homo intelllgere nunc vel her! vel o1'as.32
In sense memory the oonditions of pastness may be referred to two
things: the objects already experienced and also the acts by which
those objects were apprehended.
past only in its aots.

The intelleotual memory knows the

This is so beoause the condition of the

past applies only to those things which can exist in a definite
period ot time,

The objeot of the intelleot Is not restrioted

to a fixed time because it 1s universal, while the aot, since It
1s individual, exists in a definite time, and therefore can refer
to the past.
In the body ot the same article St. Thomas says: "Si vero de
ratione memoria. sIt quod stU$ oblectum s1t praeter1tum, at praeter1tum, memorla in parte intelleot1va non er1t, sed .ena1t1va tan-

tum, quae est apprehens1va partlculuium.

Praeteritum enim, ut

praeter1tum, cum signitioat esae sub determinato tempore, ad oondit10nem partioular1. pertlnet. uJ3

Individuals can pertain to

the past because tney exist in a definite period ot time.

But the questIon still remains.

We know that Individual aots

and individual objects can be in the past, and that they are known

321_1_, I, 19. 6 ad 2.

-

33 Ib id •• I. 79. 6 o.
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as past; but we also 'Would 11ke to know how they are known
past.

4S

As tar as it oan be ascertained, St. Thomas does not oonsider
this question explioitly in his works.

However, he does speak of

it implicItly, when he explains in the first lecture of the

lnR!

Memoria at Rem1nlscentia that memory is not of the present but of
____

the past.

11

lIe says: 1I0stand1t (Philosophus] quod memoria non est

praeaantisJ sed hoc dicit pertinere ad sensum, paF q uom neque

futurum, neque faotum, id est praeterltum, cognosoimus, sed tantummodo praeaens. n34 And he proves this trom the common manner
of speaking:
Et hoa probat ex comm.un1 usu loquentlum. Cum enim aliquld
praesentiallter adest, puta cum aliquis praesentla11ter
v1det album, nullus dtoeret se memorar1album: siout nullu8
dicit se memorari ilIud, quod per intellect·um actu cons1deratur, cum actu conalderat at 1ntelllg1t: sed cum communiter
homines vident album, nominant sent1re; et oonsiderare aliquid actu.. nominat 8Olummodo scire. Cum aIlquis autem habet
acientiam habltualem at potent1am 8 ensitlva.m sine actibus vel
operation1bus eorum, tunc dloitur mamorar1 praeteritorum
aotuum. • •• Semper 8n1m oum anima memoratur, pronunoiat
se val~rlua audlvisse allquld, vel sensisse, vel Intelle~
ls8e.3.5

When we see a white objeot, we do not say that we remember it; we
say that we see it.

In order to identIty something as past, one

must be con.cious that he does not sense those things in the present.

How is this aooomplished?

-

35Ibid., 1, n. 307.

It may be supposed that a Sen-
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tient being distinguishes between the present and the past by exeroising different powers.

It knows the present by its common sense.

aammon sense is the power by whioh one knows _one f s own senSing and
the unity of one'. experience in the present. 36 When this power
is at work: we know that we are sensing something present, as when
we see something white.

But when we sense an object without the

operation ot the common sense, we know that what we experience is
not the pre.ent.

The relatlonship with the operation of common

.en.e establishes the apprehension of the present.

When this re-

latlonahip is lacking, we know that we are aware of something past
01'

at least at somethlng absent.

This ls, perhaps, what st. Tho-

mas bas in mind when he 8ays in.Q!. Vex-it&te:

U[M]emoria secundum

proprlam sui acoeptionem respiciat ad ld quod est praeteritum respectu huius nunc"J 37 and again: "Phi1osophus loquitur de memorla

quae est praeterltl. prout .at relatum ad hoc nunc, inquantum est
hoc.,,3 8
But this, one might say, gives only a general and indefinite
notion ot the past.

I remember that this happened to me sometime

in the past, but I do not know exaot17 when.

From experience .e

know, however, that we can remember with greater precision than
this vague "collection.

36!_!., I, 78, 4 o.

--

37De Ver., 10, 2 o.

3a~., 10, 2 ad 2.

On this St. Thomas says:
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Quandoque enim allqu18 recordatur tempus non quldem sub certa
D'1Etnsura, put. quod tertia dleteoerit aliquid. sed quod allquando fecit. Quandoque autem reoordatur sub"mensura tempori8 praeterltl, quamvls non sub cf;lrtamensura. Consueverunt
en1m hominea dicere quod recordantur quidem allcuius roei ut
praeterltae, sed nesciunt quando tuerlt, quia nesclunt temporia metrum., i.est, mensuram: et hoo contlngi t proptex- de- .
bl1em impresslonem, sieut contlnglt in"his quae vldentur a
remotis, quae Indeterminata oognoseunt.39
The oonditions ot memory are fulfilled it paetness is known indeterminatel,..

But tor a perfeot reoognition one must be able to

place the objeot in the past

acc~atel,.:

tor instance, this hap-

pened to me three 447s ago.

Row 1s this aocurate plaoing ot the

object ot memory in tne past to be explained?
Since the textual evidenoe is lacking, the &nswer must be

attempted by oonjecturing.
In the passage laat quoted st. Thomas says that the reason
why we do not remember the date ot the remembered objects is that

we do not know the measure ot time in which these objeots occurred
It .e knew the measure ot time, tor instance,

t~ee

or tour days

back, we could place the remembered object in its proper historical t1me, and hence we would have an aot ot perfect reoognition.
!he explanation of how the mea.ure of time is known should be
based, 1t would seem, on at least three fundamental ideas: the
concrete awareness of self, the knowledge ot the succession ot
past act., and the ability on the papt of the subject to distinguish between the aots whioh have been plaoed earlier from

19lB ~ !!!!. !! !i!!!. t 7 t n. 397.

107
those which have been placed later in the sequence.

In the theorr ot st. Thomas, as has been explained before,
animals have awareness ot self through the knowledge ot their own
acts and known Objects.
their own permanent ego.

This gives them a conorete knowledge ot
But this ego in itself is not enough to

enable them to know the past.

They m.ust be able to focus their

attention on the various manifestations ot this ego. 1.e .. , on the
indIvidual acts Which reveal to them tneir consoious selt.

St.

Thomas says in the Summa that a sentient being knows its past
acts and the objects apprehended in the past.40 These objects and
these acts

fo~

a sequence ot experience ot wbien Cajetan speaks

In his commentary on the
quoted earller.

~ummat

in the passage which has been

ExplainIng how sense powers know time, he says:

n[N]on aliter perclpltur sensu tempus, nisi percipiendo quandam
dlstantiam successlvam ab 111a mutatione usque ad illamt et Sic,
depict! in parte sen81tlva hao et 111a mutatione, perclpltur
tempus.-41 Sense powers pe»eelve tne sequence ot their acta and
known objects in such a wa,. that they know one sensa.tion to ha.ve
tollowed another.

This g1ves them the knowledge ot suocessive

motion whioh 1s necessary tor the knowledge ot time.
It animals can distinguish one individual act from another,
and It they know theae acts in a sequenoe, it seems that they

40....S • --T.,
.

---

I,
19, 6 ad 2 •
-

41In 8.T., I-II, 40, 3.
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should be able to distinguish an act

expe~lenced

earlier in the

sequence from that experienced later, so that they can know the
time in which this particular act was placed by reference to other
acts which are prior or posterior to it.

The general point of

reterenoe is the present moment: W(M]emorla. • .eat praeterlti,
prout est relatum ad hoo nuno. ft42
~eterenoe

Having the general point of

and being able to distinguish the prior aots in the

sequence trom the posterior, the sentient being can place a re-

membered objeot acourately in its proper past time, thus putting
it in a del"inite period of its oonscious existenoe..

In this way

it can know a past object as past and can "dateD it more or less
accurately in its past experienoe.
When one identifies a recalled objeot as belonging to his
own experience and when he plaoes it in its proper historical

setting, he oan be said to have exercised an act of recognition
proper to sense

memo~.

With the recognition ot an object as an

experience ot: one's own past, one truly remembers and thus com-

plete. the process of sense memory.

42De Ver.,

--

10, 2 ad 2.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

Toward the end ot his life St. Thomas contessed that be
never torgot anything that he studied.

No doubt, his memory was

a prodigy 01' retention.

It has been said that one or two readings
were enough tor him to fix even lengthy material. l or oourse,
muoh 01' tb.1s was a 81tt 01' nattU"e.

But one t s native endowment oan

atill be trained, so that 1t can attain even better results.

St.

Thomas has set tour rules tor the oultivation 01' good memory.
al'e so simple
they have

and

~eat

The,

natural that one may easily overlook them.

practioal significance.

A short

oo~ntary

But

on

them will supplement the theory expounded in this thesis; and
since the rules are based on some 01' the theoretical points, they
will provide an oocasion to summarize

st. Thomas' doctrine on

••nae memory and tnU8 be a fitting oonclusion to the present

study.
The

to~

rules tor the oultivation ot a good memorr

in the Summa:; II-II,
by

49.

1 ad 2.

~

round

St. Thomas begins this pasaa.ge

saying that memory, even though it is a natUNll power of man,

let. Robert Edward Bl"ennan, 0.1., General PSloholoQ, 2nd ed.
(New York, 1952), p.

204.
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nevertheless it can be pertected

by

art and practice.

He 8aY8:

"[Klemeria non solum a natura proticlscltur, sed etlam habet
plurlmum artis et industriae. n2 And then he proceeds to give the
tour rules, which are: (1) to search tor good illustrations, (2)
to set in order the things to be memorlzed, el) to be eager to
learn, and (4) frequently to refleot on that whieh one wishes to
remember. 3
The first rule reads as tollows:
(p ]r1mum. .at ut eorum quae vult homo memorarl quasdam similitudlnes a.aumat oonvenientes, nee tamen omnino consuetas:
quia ea quae aunt Inconsueta magls m1ramur, et sic ln els
animus magis et vehementius det1netur; ex quo t1 t quod sorum
quae in puerltla vidtmus magls memoremur. Ideo autem n$cessar1a est huiusmodl slm11itudinum vel lmaginum adlnventio,
quia intentiones simplioes at splrituales t&0111us ex anima
elabuntur nisi quibusdam slmilitudlnlbus oorporallbus quasi
alligentur: quia humana cognltl0 potent lor est circa silnsibilia. Unde et memorativa ponitur in parte sensitiva.4

2!_!.,

II-II, 49,

1 ad 2.

'Similar rules are tound also in the commentary on Arlstotl~.
et Reminisoentl •• O(Ald bene memorandum vel reminiscen~, ex praimisais iijatuqi dooumenta utilia addiscere possumus.
Quorum pr1l1lUm est, ut stu ea~ quae vult retlnere in allquem o1"dinem deducere. Secundo ut protunde et intent. eis mantem apponat.
Tert10 \1t f'l'equen1ier med1 tetur sec\Uldum. oztdinem. Quarto ut incipi at pem1n1sci a prinoipia." In De Hem. 8t Rem., 5, n. 371.
1'h. fourth rule In this nsrlne.ttour-in the SWII1lA. It il
replaced there by the rule which speaks ot the need or Illustrations. The set ln the Summa seems tabe preferable to that ln the
commentary, because the "fourth rule in the commentary which presoribe. that one Is to begin x-emembering trom a prinoiple, seems
to be inoluded in that whlch tells us to set things in order. It
•• reoollect aooording to order, it would seem that we begin with
an object which is the principle ot the order, and then proceed to
reoall other objeots related ~o that principle,

n. _..oria

4~.I"

II-II,

49,

1 ad 2.
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Sensible illustrations and novel representations

~prove

the pe-

tentlve power of mamory, because sense impressions do not slip
away from us as easl17 as do objeots of thought.

We seem to have

-.

a greater hold on corporeal objeots than on purely intellectual
ideas. 'Henoe, to insUl"e la.sting retention, one has to tie down
the intelligible speoies to sensible things by means of apt images
and illustrations.

The unoommon here is better than the oommon,

sinoe examples with 80me freshness make a deeper impression.
The faot that we are able to remember sensible objeots easier
than non.enaibl. ones shows that memory is primarily a power ot

sense.

IfUnde at memorativa ponltur in parte aensltlva,tJ says

Thomas.

st.

This brings to mind all the points that have been dis-

oussed in this thesis on memory as a faoulty ot internal sense.
According to St. Thomas, memory proper ls in the sensitive part
of the soul.

It 1s an internal sense wboae proper object 1s the

intentions of the estimative sense as absent.
St.

~homas,

In the theory of

sen•• memory Is really distinct from the OOlml'lon sense.

Imagination, and the estimative power.

The distinctlon between

these powers has been discussed in. the seoond chapter of the theala.

As a sense power, memory functions in the bodily organ which

1s looated in the brain.

The l'etentlve quality ot memory depends

on the various dispositions of the organ, as tor instance on the
amount ot water it oontains.

That memory 1s a power mixed with

matter can be proved also f rom the tact that it knows the past as
~st.

!here is no limitation to past, present, or tuture with the
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objeot ot the intellect, sinoe it is above the dimensions of space
and time.

Sense memory, like the l'est ot the senses, is concerned

with the here-and-now aspects of things.
l-

The notion of pastness

1s assooiated with matel'ial conditions, such as magnitude, d1stance, and time.

Henee, the 1000wledge of the past pl'operly be-

longs to the sensit1ve part of the soul, and consequently memory
proper 1s a sense power, not an intellectual one.

The seoond rule tor traIning of memoI'Y bids us to set 1n
order those things which we want to remember.

St. Thomas says:

"Secundo,oportet ut homo ea quae memoriter vult tenere sua eonsideI'atione ordinate dlsponat, ut ex uno memorato taoile ad allud

procedatur.,,5
This rule is a practical application of what st. Thomas has

said on the process of recall.

The preserved images are linked

together in our memory aocording to a certain pattern: like 1s
linked with like, the unlike with its opposite, etc.

These

patterns are

They are

rete~red

to as the law8 of association.

the natural ways to recall forgotten objects w1th ease a.nd et.t1ciency.

Henoe, it we want to acquire a

ce~ta1n

ease in recol-

lection, we have to set ln order things that we want to remember.
Thls order estab11shetl log1oal connections between images, thus
enabling reason to gulde our efforts to recapture the past.
The third rule

presc~ibes

earnestness in reoelving the

~
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presaions: ttTertio, oportet ut homo sol1101tudinem apponat at
affectum adhibet ad. ea quae vult memorari : quia quo a1iqu1d magis
tuerlt impresaum animo, eo minus elabitur. n6 Eagerness or a real
w111 to learn has the advantage ot making the mind well disposed
to reoeive impressions..
on our

me.Q~,

And the more deeply an objeot ls impress8c

the less liable it is to slip away.

a more perfeot retention, and, 1n general, a better

The result ls
memo~.

Although the reception of speoies is not oonsidered by St.
Thomas as a proper function ot memory, nevertheless, it is presupposed in the operations of this internal

~.nSe.

The proper

funotions ot memory are retention, recall, and x-ecognition..

Re-

oognition is the last step in the memoratlve process in whioh the
image 1s identified as one's own experienoe and Is known as having

occurred 1n the past.

The aot ot reoeption 1s the basis tor these

funotions ot senae memory, tor without the original reception of
the speoies there oould be no retention, nor recall, nor reoognition.

Moreover, the quality ot reception determines to a large

extent the quality ot the proper functions ot memory, especially
that ot retention, as 1s suggested 1n the th1rd rule tor the cultivation ot a good memory.
Finally, in the fourth rule we are bidden to refleot otten on
what we are t1'71ng to mELster: "Quarto, oportet quod sa trequenter
medltemur quae volumus memorari.

Unde PhI1osophu5 dIcit, in libro

~

!!!.,

guod medltationes m.emoriam salvant: quia, ut in eodem

libro dieitur, consyetsQo !!!guasi natura; unde quae multotles
intelligimus olto

~em1nlscimur,

quasi natural! quodam ordlne ab

uno ad aliud procedentes."7 Frequent reflection preserves memory
because it establishes custom, and oustom is, as it were, a second nature.

The habits of memory are developed by many acts:

ft[Elx frequent! actu memorandi hab1tus memorabilium contlrmatur,"

as

st.

Thomas says in the commentary on the .Q! Memoria

.2!

~emlnl,s

oentla.
, 8
Memory as a hab! t has been explained in Chapter IV, on the
act of retention.

There the word "habit" was u.sed to mean the

midstate between actuality and pure potency.
a different meaning.

Here this word has

Those who have the ability to remember well

are said to have a habit of good memory.

Senae memory as a habit

in this sense means a capacity or disposition to act well.
Habits, in the theory of St. Thomas, are prImarily in the
rational part of the soul. 9 The sense powers cannot have habits,
because in themselves and independently ot reason they are determined in their action by

8.

sort of natural instinct.

They lack

that capacity for development whioh 1s needed for the growth of
7Ibld.; references to Aristotle are Q! ~.
a, 12-~and Ibid., 2, 452 a, 27-28.

BIn
De Mem. at Rem., 3, n. 348 •
...........................................
98 .'1'., I-II, 50, 1 o.
.

--

!!

~., 1,

451
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a hab1t. 10
Sense powera in man, however, have habits Inasmuchas they
are oontrolled by reason. ll In this sense, sense memory 1s a
habIt.

st. Thomas says on this point: It[Iln ipsis Interlor1bas

virlbus sensltlvis apprehensivls posalnt ponl allqul habItus,
secundum quos homo fit bene memoratlvus vel cogitativus vel lmaginatlyus, • • • qula etlam istae vires movantur ad operandum ex
impel"10 rationi •• ,,12 And again:
[I]n vlr1bus 8ensItlvis apprehenaivls Interlus, ponuntur a11qui habitus. Quod patet ex hoc praeoipue quod Phl1osophus
dicit, in libro de MemorIa, quod in memorando unum Eost all,!:l9., ,oEeraturo coniUeiucto, uae est"'!iu~Di guae'i!aiiliiitura: nIbi! auiem est arIu! nab tUB conlue u inaIIs quam haBitudo
acquIs1ta per consuetudinem, quae est in modum. naturae. • •
In homine tamen Id quod ex oonsuetud1ne acquirl tar In memoria, et in allls viribus sensitivis apprehenslv1s, non est
habitus per se; sed aliquid annexum habltibus intelleet1vae
part1s. 1 J

r

Sense memory is not a habIt properly so oalled, but something
annexed to the habits or the intelleotive faoulty.

By remembering

one thing atter another, we beoome used to it. and thus rorm a
habit of reoolleoting easily and effioiently.
The rules for improving the memory having been oonsidered and
a brier summary of the main ideas of the thesis having been pre.

lIThia.

SO, 3

12Ib1d., I-II,

50, 3 ad 3.

13~1d., I-II,

56, 5 0;

lOIbid., I-II,

-

--Mem. et

em .. , 2,

e.

-

referenoe to Aristotle is to his De

452 a, 29-30.
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sented, tho study of st. Thomas' teaching on sense memory may be
broutnt to a conclusion.
The purpose of the thesis was to present st. Thomas' dootrine
On sense memory.

As can be seen

rro~

the titles of the chapters

(sense memory as an internal sense, the object of sense

~emory,

the functions of sense memory), only the fundaoental ideas on the
topic have been considered.
of

st.

In order to get a oomprehensive view

Thomastthought on this internal sense, one should study

related topios as well, such as, sense memory and mental life,
its importance tOl' the building up of experience, the part it
plays in.formine univorsals, its relation to the moral lifo, especially with the virtue

ness, etc.

of prudence, the problem of forgetful-

The questions that have been discussed in the present

study oan and perhaps should be reoonsidered again, partioularly
those which could be solved here only with probabIlity, as the
distinotion between the functions of sense memory and those of
imagination, and the knowledge ot the past as past.

There 1s

still much left to be done, both on the interpretation of St.
Thomas and in the exploration of memory itself.
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